ETHOS (ETHICAL PROOFS)

According to <u>Aristotle</u>, ethos is defined as the credibility that the author establishes. Ethos is classified as one of three types of persuasion; the other two being <u>logos</u> and <u>pathos</u>. Ethos is a greek term from which ethics is derived and is referred to as ethical appeal in the rhetorical context. The basis of rhetoric is formed from the author's attitude and character toward his audience. His character is what gives value to his words and thus, provides support and proof to his arguments.

As an <u>orator</u>, one has the advantage of persuading the audience through speech as well as emotions (Homer 51) Also, there can be constant interaction between the orator and the audience. But in writing, through the words on the page, one has to thoroughly demonstrate to the audience his credibility. Thus, ethos is a critical element without which rhetoric would not be able to function.

Credibility can be established by demonstrating three characteristics in writing: intelligence, virtue, and goodwill. Intelligence, the first quality, is indicated by a certain amount of knowledge of the subject. Common sense combined with convincing arguments that are logical is essential in demonstrating this quality. Discussing the various viewpoints of a subject also exhibits a certain amount of intelligence. The audience consists of as many opinions as people and therefore, recognizing these vie wpoints only helps the author in building his persuasion.

Virtue and good character is another quality by which the author becomes believable. Stating ones beliefs, values, and priorities in connection with the subject assists in convincing the audience of the argument. If these beliefs and values coincide with the majority of the audience, the writer is well on his way to success. Goodwill is the last attribute essential to establishing credibility. This characteristic projects concerns for the audience's viewpoint and respects their intelligience, sinc erety and common sense.

The essence of the speaker's relationship to his audience is the attitude which he assumes toward them (Talmadge 157). The range of attitudes extends from formality to informality. The speaker who establishes a formal relationship with his audience e maintains " an aloof dignity " suitable for serious discourse whereas the informal speaker regards his audience more as a group of individuals with whom he can be familiar, like friends engaging in an easy conversation. The approach that a speaker uses should be determined at an early stage of planning and then carefully maintained throughout the speech (Talmadge 159). This leads to the classification of the diversified audience to which the speaker must pay attention to.

Ethos must attend to the various character types if the speaker is to address his audience successfully. It is a simple concept to comprehend because just as one has to go down to the level of a child to speak to a five-year old, the speaker has to be able to communicate in the specific type of language depending upon the whom the audience consists of.

In terms of their character, according to the Greek view, the young are "pleasure-loving, impulsive, and optimistic" (Kennedy 164). To a certain extent, these qualities hold truth; the young can also be characterized by being guileless, trusting, co urageous, confident, and adventurous. Thus, these characteristics assist the speaker in portraying a speech that will invite and discuss adventure, friendship,

Ethos

money and lust and therefore, persuade the audience upon the subject.

People who are older, past their prime years, are quite the opposite of those just described (Kennedy 167). Older people are doubtful, cynical, suspicious, querulous, small-minded, stingy, cowardly and fearful. They expect the worst out of life and live in the past of the fond memories. It is quite obvious then that the speaker should uplift the older audience, boost their self-esteem, encourage them to be more positive, and basically try to instigate love and happiness in their lives. It is through these means that the speaker will gain trust in this audience.

It is now evident that those in the prime of life will be between the young and old in character. The qualities are not of extremes such as trusting or distrusting, frugality or extravagance, but most times, the combination of the two. Without much difficulty, the speaker should easily be able to convince this group since their characteristics are in sync with normality.

In the book, On Rhetoric, Aristotle mentions that one particular reason for stressing character within the speech was that Greek law required the defendants to speak on their own behalf (38). Thus, ethos became a vital source for authority in those days. It is through their speeches and how they would convey themselves, that they would win the people.

Knowledge, of tokalon, the honarable, fine, or noble and to a lesser extent its opposite, the shameful is useful in a speaker's effort to secure the trust of the audience so that they will believe what is being said (Kennedy 78). These views portray the values of Greek society in the time of Aristotle. They infer that intellectual and moral values should be attained prior to producing rhetoric because these qualities will assist the rhetor in building trust in the audience.

The tone of the speaker also affects his ability to convince the audience. The tone of asuccessful speech will seem inseparable from the content. "This effect is achieved by the speaker who keenly aware of his own attitude toward his material, who deliberately sustains in his mind in the proper tone, and who remains in full control of it as he speaks"(Talmadge 151). Each piece of discourse has its own individual tone, for every speaker's attitude toward his material and his audience may be unique on each occasion that he speaks.

Martin Luther King Jr. was one one of the most successful users of ethos. "His voiceand moral stature were eloquent weapons in the fight for civil rights and integration in the 1960s." (Homer 51) In his letters or speeches, he establishes credibili ty in a number of ways. He provided allusions to outside authorities, reminded the audience of his motives and morals, and he appealed to the goodwill of the audience by making clear that he is answering their criticisms. Virtue is reiterated in his dis course by his constant call on God's forgiveness. "He leaves his readers with the firm impression that he is a person of intelligience, virtue and goodwill arguing a just cause and it is in his words, sentences, and allusions that King establishes his character." (Homer 54)

Persona is a term related to ethos in literarty theory. " In classical drama, a persona was literally a mask that an actor wore, both to amplify his voice and to provide clues about his character." (Covino 52) Ethos and persona are like two endpoints on a continuum, with ethos being the speaker's "real" self and persona being a fictional character appropriate for the specific situation. Although these concepts are separable, sometimes situations require the speaker to establish both ethos and persona (Covino 52)

There has been much debate in the history of rhetorical theory over the ultimate source of ethos. Aristotle argues that ethos must be established by the speech itself and may not depend on the historical

Ethos

characteristics of the speaker (Covino 52). Another argument, developed by <u>Isocrates</u>, <u>Cicero</u> and <u>Quintilian</u>, holds that the speaker's actual history may be used in order to establish credibility. The former traditi on is called the rhetorical view of ethos and the latter tradition is called the philosophical view.

"A serious concern of rhetoricians and philosophers from ancient times to the present is that rhetoric can be misused by the unscrupulous and the appearance of good character may in fact be only an appearance." (Homer 56) Rhetoric can always be used in an unethical manner and there is no way to guard against an evil person using rhetoric. Thus, the true integrity of the speaker becomes paramount because the audience responds to the image presented by the speaker. Therefore, in speech, the strengt h of the argument rests in a great degree on the credibility (ethos) that the rhetor establishes and eventually affects the main purpose of the speech - to persuade.

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited

Covino and Joliffe. Rhetoric. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.

Gorell, Robert M. and Charlton Laird. Modern English Handbook. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972.

Homer, Winifred Bryan. Rhetoric in the Classical Tradition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.

Kennedy, George A. Aristotle On Rhetoric Theory of Civic Discourse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991

Talmadge, John E. and James B. Haman and Fred Burnhauser. *The Rhetoric Reader*. Atlanta: Scott, Foresman and Company 1962.

Winterowd, W.Ross. Rhetoric A Synthesis. Atlanta: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968.

This page was authored by Yasmin Hussain at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

LOGOS (LOGICAL PROOFS)

n Greek, logos translates into "word" or "reason". In rhetoric, logos refers to systems of reasoning. Logos, along with <u>ethos</u> and <u>pathos</u>, make up means of p ersuasion called pisteis, or kinds of appeals effecting an audience (Covino & Jolliffe 15).

The History of Logos

Aristotle, also known as "The Father of Logic," was the first philosopher to create the three textual appeals of pisteis (World Book 381; Covino & Jolliffe 15). In *Rhetoric*, he describes logos as thought manifested in speech (Covino & Jolliffe 64). He also compiled his works on knowledge in *Organon*, which means instrument, because it investigates thought, the instrument of knowledge (World Book 627). It includes *The Categories, The Prior and Posterior Analytics, The Topic*, and *On Interpretation* (World Book 627). Different philosphers have had many different perceptions of logos over the centuries. In *Encomium of Helen*, the sophist Gorgias refered to the power of logos as magical and that diabolical forces reside in words (Covino & Jolliffe 64). A 6th century Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, thought of logos as the ordering principle of the universe that stands for divine reasoning (Covino & Jolliffe 64). This Greek thinking opened philosophy for others to follow (Heidegger 75).

How Logos Is Used

In actuality, logos meant more in ancient Greek than logic or reasoning, it meant "thought plus action" (Covino & Jolliffe 17). It appeals to patterns, conventions, and modes of reasoning that the audience finds convincing and persuasive (Covino & Jolliffe 17). Logos, pathos, and ethos are completely different, yet, they all correlate. Ethos moves an audience by proving the credibility of the rhetor; pathos stimulates the feelings of the audience and seeks change in their attitudes and actions; and logos, along with ethos and pathos, mobilizes the powers of reasoning (Covino & Jolliffe 17). A rhetor must consider all three means of persuasion if he is to convince the audience of the conclusion he wants them to believe or act upon. Before engaging in discourse, the rhetor must ask himself the following:

- 1. What do we believe, think, or feel in common?
- 2. Are the premises, or evidence, for the argument just and appropriate? and
- 3. Does the proper conclusion follow from the assumptions of the premises and what would prevent the audience from accepting the conclusion? (Covino & Jolliffe).

Accurately analyzing a rhetorical situation beforehand requires theorizing, judging, calculating, concluding, inferring, and observing the audience (Zaner 627). Logos is just one of the many things the rhetor must consider when forming an effective argument.

Kinds of Logic

Logic, the main component of logos, is the study of the principles and methods of argumentation (World Book 381). These arguments consist of a set of statements that serve as premises, or statements of evidence, that conclusions can be drawn from (World Book 381). The key to evaluating arguments is

distinguishing the valid from the invalid ones. The following is an example of a valid argument:

All men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.

Socrates is mortal.

And here, an invalid argument:

All weeds are plants.

The flower is a plant.

All weeds are flowers.

Sometimes the correctness of an argument depends on its form, not the actual truth or falseness of the premises (World Book 381).

With **deductive** logic, the conclusion is a necessary consequence of the premises with rules pretaining to valid arguments (World Book 381).

- 1. If A implies B and B implies C, then A implies C.
- 2. If A implies B and A is true, then B is true.
- 3. If A implies B and B is false, then A is false.

The most common type of deductive logic is a <u>syllogism</u> which will be discussed further on in the paper.

With **inductive** logic, the conclusion is only more or less probable on the basis of the premises (World Book 381). Because of this, the grounds for belief, or the validity of the premises, are studied (World Book 381). The premises of inductive arguments are based on generalizations, analogies, or causal connections (World Book 381). Principles making assertions about all members of a class of objects are generalizations and an analogy compares two or more things which agree in some respects (World Book 381). But, causal connections correlate to cause and effect (World Book 381). For example: If a person gets restless as the temperature rises, he might conclude that heat makes him restless, making a causal connection.

Tools of Logos

Aristotle was the first philosopher to analyze the process whereby propositions can be logically inferred to be true from two other propositions being true, which he called a syllogism (World Book 628). A syllogism, as I mentioned earlier, is the most common type of deductive logic. Aristotle called it the "main instrument for reaching scientific conclusions" (World Book 381). The "All men are mortal..." argument from earlier is a perfect example of the syllogism. It must have three terms, whereby two negative premises yield no conclusion, and two positive premises yield a positive conclusion (World Book 381). Yet, from a positive and negative premise, only a negative conclusion can result (World Book 381). Plus, the term occuring in both premises must be modified by "all" or "none" at least once (World Book 381). For example:

All books printed in 1660 are valuble.

These books were printed in 1660.

Therefore, these books are valuable.

And this would conclude that the term that occurs in the conclusion that's modified by "all" or "none," must be modified by "all" or "none" in the premises.

An meme is more a transaction of logos based on assumptions, assertions or observations, and claims (Covino & Jolliffe 20). Aristotle defined enthymeme as a "rhetorical syllogism" saying that "enthymeme is to rhetoric as syllogism is to logic" (Covino & Jolliffe 20). With enthymeme, he stated that rhetors argue logically by citing examples in which the success of the argument depends on the acceptance of the context (Covino & Jolliffe 20). The major difference of enthymeme from syllogism is that neither the premises nor the conclusions are provable (Covino & Jolliffe 20).

The tools of logos are not totally related to logic and reasoning. Pathos **and** ethos must coinside with logos for the audience to accept the rhetor's observations about the subject as valid and to believe the conclusion the rhetor wants them to.

Modern vs. Ancient Logos

The concept of logos has bred many different theories and opinions over the centuries. Feminist today actually think of logos as a term of exclusion since it has references to a male god (Covino & Jolliffe). Perhaps, these feelings are warranted because even back in ancient Greece the ancients considered women to be on a lower scale of being, thus incapable of reason (Covino & Jolliffe 65). Today it's almost inconceivable that kind of mentality ever existed. From Aristotle's pisteis to Gorgias's diabolical forces and Heraclitus's divine reasoning, the power of logos has been analyzed and argued over.

None of these philosophers or theories are wrong and none are entirely right either. However, persuading people logically with discourse existed long before the actual term "logos" did. One thing that is true that no philospher could argue with is that logos has provided a key building block to the way we all communicate with one another today.

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited

- Covino, William A., and David A. Jolliffe. *Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1984.
- The World Book Encyclopedia. vol 1. Chicago: World Book-Childcraft International, Inc., 1980.
- The World Book Encyclopedia. vol 12. Chicago: World Book-Childcraft International, Inc., 1980.
- Zaner, Richard M. A Century of Psychology as Science. Ed. Sigmund Koch & David E. Leary. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association, 1992.

This page was last updated on Friday, December 1 at 10:22 am by Renee Corinne Crawford, its author,

at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

PATHOS (PATHETIC/EMOTIONAL)

Part 1 | <u>Part 2</u>

P athos, also called pathetic or emotional proofs, is the persuasion of audiences by using emotions. (Lanham, 74) In <u>Aristotle's</u> book *Rhetoric* he states that there are two different categories of persuasion. First there is the unartful or atechnical type which is witness, torture, and contracts which may be used when available.(McKeon, 717) The other type is the artful or technical type which must be invented by the speaker. These are <u>ethos</u>, <u>logos</u>, and pathos. (Nash, 209)

Pathos is the form of persuasion based on emotion. It has worked effectively when it has drawn up the sympathies and emotions of the audience causing them to accept the ideas, propositions, or calls to action. (Covino, 17) Aristotle states that pathos can use the emotions of "anger and mildness; friendship and enmity; fear and boldness; shame and shamelessness; graditude; pity and indignation; envy and emulation." (O'Neil, 260)

Aristotle goes on to characterize the social groups such as the elderly, and the wealthy and the emtions that work well to persuade them. He defines the dominant emotion of each group. Many rhetors believe that Aristotle's categories were for young men in Athens who were trying to gain political influence. They say that today it is not wise to stereo-type the audience when persuading, but that Aristotle's different categories of persuasion help the rhetors of today. (Covino, 17)

Part 1 | Part 2

A athos, also called pathetic or emotional proofs, is the persuasion of audiences by using emotions. It has worked effectively when it has drawn up the sympathies and emotions of the audience causing them to accept the ideas, propositions, or calls to action (Covino, 17).

The meaning of discourse is dependent upon beliefs and ideas that inform the audience's state of mind. As Chaim Perelman states, "to adapt an audience is, above all, to choose as premises of argumentation theses the audience already holds." Aristotle's basic treatment of pathos was the fitting of one's text to the character types and states of mind that make up one's audience. This has held true from classical rhetoric, although now it is unwise to stereotype the audience into a certain category. The meaning of pathos expands in modern rhetoric. Richard M. Weaver's most lasting contribution to modern rhetorical theory are the expressions "God's terms" and "Devil's terms," which basically denotes that certain words automatically have a positive or negative connotation according to the audience. Word choice, or style a rhetor uses subtly appeals to the audience's feelings.

Pathos is one of three forms of persuasion in rhetoric. The other two, ethos and logos, are closely related to pathos. For instance, the logos of one's speech must fit the pathos of the audience in order to have an effect. Pathos is tied to a virtuous ethos as well. A rhetor of goodwill seeks to evoke the same in the audience (Covino 17).

Pathos plays an important role today in a variety of styles of rhetoric. It has become a key element of tragic literature, where characters evoke the audience's pity by appealing to "what one has suffered"

PATHOS

(Covino 71). It is clearly present in the social interactions of which science is the product (Gross 574). Scientists involve their emotions when writing reviews, seeking funding, or simply proposing new or controversial ideas.

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited for Part One

- Covino, William A. and David A. Jolliffe ed. *Rhetoric: concepts, definitions, boundaries*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.
- Lanham, Richard A. A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- McKeon, Richard. Introdustion to Aristotle. Chicago: The University Press, 1973.
- Nash, Walter. Rhetoric. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989.
- O'Neil, James Milton, Craven Laylock, and Robert Leighton Scales. *Argumentation and Debate*. New York: The MacMillian Company, 1922.

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited for Part Two

- Covino, William A. and David A. Joliffe ed. Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.
- Fortenbaugh, W. W. Aristotle on Emotion: A contribution to philosophical psychology, rhetoric, poetics, politics, and ethics. New York: Barnes and Noble,1975.

Part 1 was authored by Kerrie Mallory of the <u>Georgia Institute of Technology</u>. It was last updated on Thursday, November 30, 1995.

Part 2 authored by Alicia Hodler of the Georgia Institute of Technology. It was last updated on March 12,1996

ARISTOTLE

Part 1 | Part 2

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was a Greek philosopher, educator, and scientist. He was able to combine the thoughts of Socrates and Plato to create his own ideas and definition of rhetoric. He wrote influential works such as *Rhetoric* and *Organon*, which presented these new ideas and theories on rhetoric. Much of what is Western thought today evolved from Aristotle's theories and experiments on rhetoric.

Aristotle's Life

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C., in Northern Greece. His father was a physician to the king of Macedonia, Amyntas II. Amyntas II was the grandfather of Alexander the Great. When Aristotle was still a boy, both of his parents died; so he was raised by a guardian named Proxenus. At the age of seventeen, he went to Athens to attend Plato's school, the Academy. Aristotle stayed at the Academy for twenty years as a student, a research assistant, a lecturer, and a research scientist. After Plato died, he moved and lived with Hermeias, a former pupil of Plato. During his three year stay, Aristotle married princess Pithias, Hermeias's daughter. The couple had two children: a son named Nicomachus and a daughter. In 342 B.C., Aristotle was invited to educate Alexander by Philip of Macedon. He taught Alexander until King Philip was assassinated, then Alexander became ruler. In 335 B.C., he left Macedonia and returned to Athens to found a school named Lyceum. Twelve years later, when Alexander died, the Athenians charged Aristotle with impiety because they resented his relationship with Alexander and other influential Macedonians. Aristotle said that he would not let the Athenians "sin twice against philosophy" (Soll, 663), so he fled to Chalcis. One year later he died at the age of sixty-two.

Aristotle's Writings and Philosophies

Aristotle's writings can be categorized into three groups: popular writings, memoranda, and the treatises. His popular writings were written for a general audience and modeled after Plato's dialogues. The memoranda is a collection of research materials and historical records. Most of the writings from these two groups have been lost. The third group, the treatises, was written for his classes, to teach his students. They were either lecture notes or textbooks. These treatises were made only for the students and are the only writings that still survive today. Aristotle's early writings showed his admiration for Plato by imitating Plato's style. He wrote in dialogue form and his themes were variations of themes that Plato had developed. Later on, his writings strayed from Platonistic views and they compared concrete fact to the abstract and often clashed with the views of Plato. Two of his most important writings concerning rhetoric are *Organon* and *Rhetoric*.

Organon was a collection of papers that included the *Categories*, the *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and *On Interpretation*. The word organon means instrument. In these papers Aristotle investigates thought, which is the instrument of knowledge.

Rhetoric was written sometime between 360 and 334 B.C. In this work, he writes about the art of public speaking. It seems that he is writing in direct response to Plato's condemnation of the art. He believes that

different rhetoric treats specific cases. These specific cases are <u>topoi</u>, which are different topics that can be persuaded. In Book two of *Rhetoric*, he lists the twenty-eight common topics, or topoi. He also addresses <u>style</u>, diction, <u>metaphor</u>, and <u>arrangement</u>, but he basically ignores the other canons of rhetoric. This work was the first psychological rhetoric ever presented.

The theory of the <u>syllogism</u> was first introduced by Aristotle. He was the first to analyze an argument in a logical order. The generic syllogism is if A belongs to all B, and B belongs to all C, then A belongs to all C. A syllogism can either be dialectical or rhetorical. Dialectical syllogisms are always true. Rhetorical syllogisms are probably true, but not always true. The rhetorical syllogism is also called an enthymeme. An enthymeme is "a statement that transfers attitudes the audience already holds to the case at hand: it is like a syllogism, except that its result is not new knowledge, but action" (Brumbaugh, 187). The enthymeme has a missing part that must be filled in by the audience. Syllogism and enthymeme are very closely related.

Another concept, pisteis, was developed by Aristotle. Pisteis is divided into three sections: <u>ethos</u>, <u>pathos</u>, and <u>logos</u>. Ethos is the credibility of the rhetor. Pathos is the emotions of the audience. Aristotle wrote about the different emotions to use on specific groups of people, in order to persuade them of some idea. Logos is the power of reasoning shared by the rhetor and the audience. All three are intertwined, even though they are categorized separately.

Aristotle had his own beliefs on rhetoric. He believed that "[the function of rhetoric] is not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case" (Covino, 3). Aristotle studied the art of argument and developed an optimistic view. He "finds hope in the belief (1) that rhetoric is useful, because the true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, (2) that generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade and (3) that men have a sufficient natural capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it" (Stone, 93). He also believed that even though persuasive argument is all classified under rhetoric, that each argument is its own case and should be dealt with differently than all other cases. Aristotle had strong opinions on rhetoric which influenced many others.

After his death, Aristotle's works were perpetuated at the Peripatetic school by some of his loyal followers. Between 500 and 1000 his ideas disappeared in Western thought, but were preserved by Arabic and Syrian scholars. These scholars reintroduced Aristotle to Western thought betwen 1100 and 1200. Since this time, Aristotle has been extremely influential in Western thought on rhetoric.

Top | Part 2

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), a Greek philosopher, educator, and scientist is arguably the most renowned and respected student of rhetoric in history. It is because of the early works of Aristotle that the field of rhetoric is as defined and understood as it is today. By combining the thoughts of earlier philosophers such as Socrates and <u>Plato</u>, Aristotle created his own ideas and definitions of rhetoric. He incorporated these ideas into essays and books such as *Rhetoric* and *Organon*, which are still valued by rhetoricians in present day applications. It is plain to see that much of what is Western thought evolved from Aristotle's theories and experiments with rhetoric.

Aristotle's Life

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. in the small northern Greek town of Stagiros. The son of a physician, Aristotle was introduced to the field of medicine at an early age. It is this knowledge of anatomy and organic structure, many say, that enabled him to develop a remarkable talent for observation and discovery. His father was the personal physician of the great Macedonian king, Amyntas II, the grandfather of Alexander the Great. When Aristotle was still a boy, both of his parents died. From this point he was raised by a guardian named Proxenus until he departed for Athens to attend Plato's Academy. He remained at Plato's school for over twenty years where he served as a student, research assistant, lecturer, and a research scientist. While at Plato's school, Aristotle developed a personal affection for Plato and learned many things from his instructor. However, he ultimately rejected Plato's fundamental concepts and developed his own theories on matters of logic, ethics, metaphysics, as well as rhetoric. After the death of Plato in 347 B.C., Aristotle moved in with a former pupil of Plato, Hermeias. During his three year stay, he married princess Pithias, Hermeias's daughter. The couple had two children: a son named Nicomachus as well as a daughter. In 342 B.C Aristotle was invited to direct the education of young prince Alexander at the court of Philip II of Macedonia. During this time he continued his studies with a few private students of philosophy and completed his most famous work, the *Rhetoric*. He taught Alexander until King Philip was assassinated, after which the prince became king. In 335 B.C. he left Macedonia and returned to Athens to open his own school named "Lyceum." Here he taught many popular subjects such as ethics, politics, and rhetoric before focusing his attention solely to metaphysics. With the death of Alexander in 323 B.C., and public scrutiny growing over his relationship with Alexander and other influential Macedonians growing, he turned his school over to Theophrastus and moved to the island of Euboea. Here he lived only a short time before dying in 322 B.C. at the age of sixty-two.

Aristotle's Writings and Philosophies

The majority of Aristotle's writings have since been lost or destroyed in the years following his death. Each work that he produced, however, could be divided into three specific categories: popular writings, memoranda, and the treatises. The popular writings were written for a general audience and modeled after the dialogues of Plato. An example of these would be speeches and public addresses concentrating on particular subjects such as politics or ethics. His second type of text, the memoranda, was a collection of research material and historical records that Aristotle compiled throughout his many years as a student and research scientist. Unfortunately most of the popular writing and memoranda of Aristotle have not survived the ages since his lifetime. The third group of writings, the treatises, is the only type that still exist today. They include lecture notes or textbooks written for the many classes that he taught at the "Lyceum" and other places across Greece

The early writings of Aristotle exhibited his admiration for his teacher, Plato. He imitated Plato's style by writing in dialogue form and using many of the same themes developed by his instructor. However, as he continued his studies at the Academy, Aristotle began to develop his own individual views which differed from those of Plato. He began to concentrate on concrete, logical concepts as opposed to Plato's more conceptual views. Although his views often clashed with those of his student, Plato continued to support Aristotle and encouraged him to promote his own theories of formal logic and rhetoric. These new ideas were expressed in his two most famous works, *Organon* and *Rhetoric*.

The *Organon*, or "instrument", was a collection of papers that included the *Categories, Prior and Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics*, and *On Interpretation*. In these, Aristotle introduced formal logic which he described as the instrument of knowledge. The *Rhetoric* was written between 360 B.C. and 334 B.C. and dealt with the art of public speaking. This work is clearly written in response to Plato's condemnation of this art. Aristotle was primarily concerned with the rhetoric of "public address is the civic life of Greece" (Kennedy 7). He believed rhetoric could be divided into specific cases where different types of rhetoric strategies could be used. He called these strategies topoi. In Book Two of *Rhetoric* he lists twenty-eight common topoi. He also addresses other rhetoric elements such as style, diction, metaphor, and arrangement, but basically ignored the other canons of rhetoric. In any case, this work was the first example of psychological rhetoric ever presented.

One of the most notable concepts developed by Aristotle was the notion of pisteis, or proofs. He believed that there were three means in which persuasion could be accomplished in public address. Pisteis is divided into three sections: ethos, pathos, logos. Ethos is concerned with establishing the moral character of the rhetor. Pathos appeals to the emotions of the audience and logos is described as logical reasoning meant to engage the audience into the rhetors beliefs. Each of these three elements, though seperate, can be combined to elicit a maximum response from the audience.

Aristotle was the first to analyze an argument in a logical, orderly manner. He did this by using enthymemes and syllogisms. He described a <u>syllogism</u> as a "deductive argument consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion" (319). The generic syllogism is as follows: If A belongs to all B, and B belongs to all C, then A belongs to all C. A syllogism, when used in rhetoric context, was called an <u>enthymeme</u>. An enthymeme is "like a syllogism, except that its result is not new knowledge, but action" (Brumbaugh 187). In an enthymeme the rhetor assumes that the audience is an active participant, will "supply the missing part" and be persuaded of the enthymeme's truth by virtue of having participated in making it fully meaningful" (Covino 48). Enthymemes and syllogisms, as you can see are very closely related.

Through his many years of studying the elements of rhetoric, Aristotle developed a general definition that is still accepted today. He believed that "[the function of rhetoric] is not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case" (3). His *Rhetoric* expressed that rhetoric is a "tool applicable to any subject and from the universality of its basic, organized concepts" (Kennedy 309). It encompasses an extremely large territory and "is the propery of no other discipline . . . It impinges on all areas of human concern" (Winterowd 14). In this sense, he explained that even though all persuasive arguments are classified as rhetoric, each should be dealt with in its own case and individual of all other cases (14). It is Aristotle who first recognized the relationship between rhetoric and the various disciplines of the arts and ""sciences"". He believed that rhetoric played a large part in every method of learning and there were specific tools which were essential to each type of study (Kennedy 12). Of these tool he felt that logic was one of the most important, if not the most important tool used in rhetoric thinking. Aristotle considered rhetoric a tool in argumentation, particularly the kind that arose in the courts and halls of government of his time.

Since his lifetime the ideas of Aristotle have been carried on through the centuries and have remained a fixture in modern day theory. His interest in the logical, rational side of discourse remain with us today in many forms. For this reason it can be said with little argument that "Aristotle is rhetoric."

After his death, Aristotle's words were perpetuated at the Perpatetic school by his loyal followers.

Unfortunatley many of his ideas disappeared in Western philosophy between 500 and 1000 A.D., but were preserved by Arabic and Syrian scholars which reintroduced Aristotle to the Western world between. Since this time, his ideas have been extremely influential in Western rhetoric analysis.

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited for Part 1

Brumbaugh, Robert S. *The Philosophers of Greece*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981. p. 172-183.

Covino, William A., and David A. Jolliffe. *Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.

Soll, Ivan. "Aristotle". *The World Book Encyclopedia*. Chicago: World Book, Inc., 1989, Vol. 1, p. 663-664.

Stone, I.F. The Trial of Socrates. Boston: Little, Brown And Company, 1988. p. 92-94.

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited for Part 2

- Brumbough, Robert S.. *The Philosophers of Greece*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981.
- Covino, William A. and David A. Holliffe. *Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boudaries.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.
- Kennedy, George E. Aristotle: On Rhetoric. New York: Oxford University Pess Inc., 1985.
- Winterowd, Ross W. Rhetoric: A Synthesis. New York: Holt, RInehart and Winston, Inc. 1968.
- Aristotle at the Idaho State University College of Education.

Part 1 was created by <u>Ellen Dickson</u> at the <u>Georgia Institute of Technology</u> last updated on December 1, 1995.

Part 2 was authored by Brad Shepherd of the <u>Georgia Institute of Technology</u>. It was last updated on March 12, 1996

PLATO

Plato was a Greek who was born in 428 BC. He was taught by philosopher Socrates and acquired many of his philosophies. He met the philosopher in boyhood and through many years of teaching he developed a deep respect for him. He also wrote a lot about Socrates because of this respect that he had for him. He is also known for being the mentor of <u>Aristotle</u>. In 387, Plato founded the Megarian Institute of Philosophy. The school primarily focused on the areas of philosophy and sciences. Plato spent the majority of the rest of his life presiding over the academy. He was the founder of Platonism, a philosophy named for himself. He went on to be one of the most famous Greek philosophers

Plato's Writings

Plato took many of his ideas about Rhetoric from his mentor, Socrates. Therefore, many of his writings included Socrates as the main character presenting the point of view that Plato wanted to convey. Both he and Socrates felt that rhetoric is most often used for selfish reasons. This is shown through Plato's work, Gorgias Gorgias says that rhetoric is "the queen of all arts" while Socrates argues that rhetoric is simply "a knack for humoring the audience." On top of this, Plato and Socrates felt that using rhetoric is immoral and "conducive to health of soul." In another work *Protagoras*, Plato presents another conflict between Platonists and Sophists. He details Socratic morality and shows the primary difference between his view and the Sophists view. The Platonist view is that the conduct of life is not teachable and the Sophist view is the opposite. The *Phaedro* is to show Plato's point of view that the soul is immortal. Perhaps his most famous work is the *Republic*.It deals primarily with justice. It presents the idea that there are three parts to the soul being reason, appetite and spirit. They felt that this qualified rhetoric as being immoral. Plato wrote many stories that were in fact rhetorical though he felt that rhetoric was immoral. His writings were not written for self-serving reasons though. They were mostly written to persuade people of his opinion of the way the world was. Thus he was using rhetoric to convince people of factual knowledge, so to speak.

୦୭୭୭

Works Cited

- The New Encyclopedia Brittanica. Plato and Platonism. Chicago, 1994. pp. 893-899.
- Covino, William A., and David A. Jolliffe. *Rhetoric; Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries*. Boston; Allyn and Bacon. 1995.
- Levey, G. R., and J. A. Stewart. Myths of Plato. Barnes and Noble. 1971. 36-41.
- Robinson, T. M. Plato's Psychology. University of Toronto Press, Toronto; 1970. pp. 15-20.

Page authored by Mark Johnson of Georgia Tech last updated November 26, 1995

ORATORY

Oratory is more than ordinary speech. It is a special kind of public speaking. The orator speaks for a special purpose, in a special way, at a special time. Buehler and Johannesen define oratory as "a memorized, original, persuasive speech, dealing with worth-while subject matter of timely interests, demonstrating qualities of logic, organization, language, and <u>delivery</u>, and producing an effect of eloquence which is far above the ordinary." Oratory rises above the common level of speech and has a greater level of appeal and emotional impact of the listener. Its purpose is to impress, convince, or move the speaker to action.

History of Oratory and Rhetoric

Oratory was being practiced by people long before the ancient rhetoricians developed a theory and a vocabulary for rhetoric. The ancient rhetoricians actually developed rhetoric by observing the fact that certain orators were effective and others were not. These rhetoricians then developed a set of principles for successful communication. Horner comments that "it is these principles that make up the art of rhetoric."

To the Greeks oratory was among the noblest of arts and oration was the aristocrat of all forms of public speaking. The orator, among the ancient Greeks and Romans, was looked upon with high esteem. He was highly respected and greatly admired and was concerned a citizen of unusual ability and influence. <u>Aristotle</u> defined oratory as "the faculty of finding all the means of persuasion on a subject." <u>Cicero</u> considered it as "the art of persuasion," and <u>Quintilian</u> viewed it as "the art of speaking well."

Parts of Oratory

Delivery is an important factor of oratory. For the orator to correctly communicate with his audience he must be able to correctly practice the art of delivery. An example of poor delivery, which everyone surly has experienced, is a boring lecture where the speaker seemed wooden and monotonous. In this type of situation, no matter what the orator is trying to say he will be hard pressed to have a great effect on his audience. In order to have an effect the speaker needs to understand the art of deliver and be able to communicate to the audience in an animated, interesting, and persuasive manner.

Another crucial part of oratory is <u>pathos</u>. Pathos is the art of drawing upon the sympathies and emotions of the audience, causing them accept the rhetors ideas, propositions, or calls for action. If used correctly by the rhetor, pathos will stimulate the audience's feelings and seek a change in their in their attitudes and actions.

Still another part of oratory is oration, the action of using oratory in speech. In the same sense as oratory, an oration is your best speech combined with a part of yourself. It gives the audience more than a snapshot view of the thought. Buehler and Joannesen write that "it is important to think of an oration as being more that a mere photographed picture of thought and feeling . . . it is a portrait of a compelling thought." Oration speaks to the listener's soul and conscience, and appeals to his aesthetic sense.

Great Orators of the Twentieth Century

Oratory

Among the great orators of the twentieth century includes Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., JFK, and Winston Churchill. Malcolm's earlier speeches are often characterized by "provocative rhetoric and violent imagery"(online source). JFK was known to place a sense of hope and expectation in his speeches. Martin Luther King's great gift in oratory allowed him to influence a vast number of others and play a monumental role in the civil rights movement. Here are some sound clips which give an example of their oratorical style:

- <u>Winston Churchill(148K.wav)</u>
- Martin Luther King's dream for his people...(209K.wav)
- JFK: For the Defense of Liberty Everywhere(212K.au)
- <u>Malcolm X</u>

0000

Works Cited

- Buehler, E. C., and Richard L. Johannesen. *Building the Contest Oration*. New York: The H. W.Wilson Company, 1965.
- Horner, Winfred Bryan. *Rhetoric in the Classical Tradition*. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1988.
- Online Source: www.webcorp.com/civilrights/malcolmx.htm
- Jay, Antony. The New Oratory. American Management Association, 1971.

This page was authored by <u>Danny James</u> of the Georgia Institute of Technology. It was last updated on 1 December, 1995.

QUINTILIAN

Marcus Fabius Quintilian was born in Calagurris, Spain in 35 A.D. with a roman rhetorician as a father. He was therefore sent to Rome where he was educated in rhetoric. After his education was complete, he returned to Spain and became a rhetorician of worthy note there. He later returned to Rome and began to teach. He published three works, of which only his Institutio Oratoria survived.

His Life

Quintilian was born in Calagurris, Spain in 35 A.D. to a roman rhetorician. His father took him to Rome to be educated in the art of rhetoric. While in Rome, Quintilian was educated by such rhetoricians as Remmius Palaemon, Domitius and Afer. After his education was complete, he returned to Spain to begin practice as a rhetorician. In 68 A.D. he was brought back to Rome and began to teach there. He became the first rhetorician to set up a truly public school, and to receive a state salary. He was also the only rhetorician to receive an imperial grant. As a teacher of rhetoric, Quintilian taught several people that were of some importance. These included the younger Pliney, the two sons of Domitilla, and the sister of Domitian. Quintilian taught rhetoric for twenty years before he retired at age 50. After finished with teaching, he was asked by several of his friends, mainly Trypho, to publish a book on rhetorical pedagogy. The book he wrote was Institutio Oritoria, and is the only work of his to survive to this day. He published only two other works, on being a speech in defense of a suspected murderer, and the other a treatise entitled "On the decadence of roman oratory."

His Ideals

Quintilian lived in the time period following <u>Cicero</u>, and was therefore influenced by him. Many of Quintilian's ideals on rhetoric and rhetorical pedagogy are parallel to those of Cicero. These parallels were so close, that Quintilian was often called an imitator of Cicero. Cicero was also influenced by <u>Isocrates</u>, and therefore had ideals parallel to those of him, as did Quintilian. Quintilian believed that there was a level which a rhetorician could reach that he felt was perfect. He developed five main objectives that this rhetorician would have to follow to reach and maintain this level. These included protecting the innocent, defending the truth, deterring crime and criminal activities, inspiring the military, and in general, inspire the public. These ideals were what Quintilian felt every rhetorician should strive for to be a true rhetorician, a "good man skilled at speaking." Quintilian felt that teaching rhetoric had several steps that had to be followed in order. Included in these steps, is the progression from one form of communication to two. These methods are described in full detail in Quintilian's *Intitutio de Oratoria*.

Institutio Oratoria

History

The Institutio Oratoria is Quintilian's only surviving work. It is a collection of twelve books written on the education of rhetoricians from childhood to death. The work has a rich history both of its influence

Quintilian

on others, and others' influence on it. After it was published by Quintilian, it circulated sparingly, with little interest. Its influence finally disappeared around 800 A.D. It then reappears in the twelfth century, and becomes a strong influence in the middle ages before disappearing again in the mid 1100's. Its influence on the education of this period was so strong, that it has been associated to the end of the medieval period. During this time the work was in several incomplete versions, resulting from changes made by many people over the span of centuries. The resulting versions discouraged people from reading the work, and gave Quintilian a marred reputation. During the Medieval period, the forms of Quintilian's work that were available were the textus mutilatus (the text with big gaps), excerpts in florigalia (choice excerpts), Pseudo-Quintilian declamations, and rarely a complete text. In 1416, the complete text was re-discovered by Poggio at the St. Gall monastery. When he found the text, he quickly copied it, and brought it home with him. About forty copies of his original copies are still extant. The work became a strong influence again, and the demand for the work also grew strong. Between 1470 and 1539 forty-three versions were produced.

Content

The *Institutio Oritoria* was written on how a rhetorician should be educated. The first two books are devoted to discussing how children are started on the subject. Book three discusses the origin of the art, and its different branches, as well as the <u>stasis theory</u>. Book four describes the different parts of a speech, and book five discusses proofs and <u>enthymemes</u>. Book six studies the emotions involved with rhetoric, and book seven deals with <u>arrangement</u>. Books eight and nine concentrate on the various uses of <u>style</u>, and book ten describes reading and writing. Book eleven is written on <u>memory</u> and <u>delivery</u>, while the last book gives Quintilian's views on what a perfect rhetorician is, and what happens when a rhetorician retires.

୦୭୭୭

Works Cited

- Covino, William A. and David A. Jolliffe, Rhetoric, Allyn and Bacon, Mass.: 1995
- Conley, Thomas M., Rhetoric in the European Tradition, Longman, New York: 1990
- Golden, James L. and Goodwin Berquist and Wiliam Coleman, *The Rhetoric of Western Thought*, 3rd ed. Kendall/Hunt Pub. Co., Dubuque, Iowa: 1983
- McCall, Marsh h. Jr., *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1969
- Murphy, James J., Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, University of California Press, Berkley Ca.: 1974
- Warmington, E. H., ed., *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*, H. E. Butler, trans., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1969

This page authored by Theral Mackey of theGeorgia Institute of Technology.

CICERO

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.) was both a Roman orator and statesman. His extensive philosophical interest led him to author several classic philosophical works like "De Oratore" (Hiz 113). Although he was often criticized for lack of originality, few could deny his superiority in rhetoric.

Cicero's philosophical writings demonstrate a "fairly coherent and modestly original system of thought" (Hiz 113). At the least, Cicero acquired a foundation for his views from the Academy. The Academy stood for free <u>inquiry</u> and the search for truth or at least what would be considered the most predictable opinion (Clarke 55).

Rhetoric and Philosophy

Cicero felt that the Greeks had already exhausted the possible methods for the pursuit of truth. The originality of his ideas lies in their combination and not their components. Although historians have creditted Socrates with the union of philosophy and rhetoric, Cicero credits the alliance of these arts to the previous followers of rhetorical <u>sophism</u>. In contrast to Socrates, Cicero believed more emphasis should be put on the rhetorical aspect and not the philosophical aspect of sophism(Siegal 12). Cicero believed that the productive application of knowledge for the guidance of human affairs was the greatest of human accomplishments. Philosophy generated knowledge but rhetorical persuasion made it effective. Each was dependent upon the other. They could not stand alone. A great man would be the master of both.

Not all of Cicero's contemporaries agreed with this combination of rhetoric and philosophy. In Cicero's "De Oratore", he criticizes Socrates for trying to keep the ideals independent of each other. This would seem to ally Cicero with the views of <u>Isocrates</u> instead of with those of <u>Plato</u>. Ironically, Cicero did not see his union of rhetoric and philosophy in complete opposition to the ideas behind Platonism. He felt that they actually had some parallels (Hiz 113).

His devotion to the most notable of his concepts, the joint ideal of philosophy and rhetoric or eloquence, the term Cicero preferred to use, influenced Cicero to the belief that if the statesman-philosopher was to speak on all topics persuasively, he must be knowledgeable on all topics. He recognized that this was virtually impossible, so he proceeded to advocate liberal education as the best way to broaden one's intellectual scope. Philosophical study was a significant element of liberal education. Cicero's works supplied the materials for study. Therefore, in his writings as well as his speeches, he united rhetoric and philosophy for the benefit of the Roman people.

De Oratore

Cicero's literary form stressed a didactic intent and "De Oratore," one of his most influential works was no exception. In it, the historical figures Antonius and Crassus debate on one of the most fundamental concepts of rhetoric. Antonius argued that eloquence could be learned while Crassus felt that eloquence came from an innate talent and knowledge of eloquence. Our comprehension of classical rhetoric since the Renaissance until the present was heavily influenced by several of Cicero's works including "De Oratore." Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle all had significant impacts on Cicero's compositions. Cicero's views were typical of the classical age. He believed that changing times trigger and influence eloquence as our knowledge of the world broadens.

The real power of eloquence is such that it embraces all things in the world, all virtues, duties, and all nature, so far as it affects the manners, minds, and lives of mankind. ("De Oratore" 3.20)

Cicero on Delivery

Cicero, along with fellow Roman rhetorician <u>Quintilian</u>, stressed the necessity for proper gesture and voice in meeting the situational demands of rhetoric (Covino 43).

Nature has assigned to each emotion a particular look and tone of voice and bearing of its own; and the whole of a person's frame and every look on his face and utterance of his voice are like strings of a harp, and sound according as they are struck by each successive emotion. ("De Oratore")

By studying the famous actors Roscius and Aesopus, Cicero learned to improve his <u>delivery</u>. A detailed understanding of public speaking technique along with long hours of practice aided Cicero (Rolfe 67).

Cicero's Seven Parts of Oratory

In order for speech to reach its full potential, Cicero felt that the <u>arrangement</u> of <u>oratory</u> should be of top priority. Here is a brief list of terms and definitions which are essential for oral rhetoric.

- 1. Entrance-the opening at which time the subject is introduced and good intentions are assured
- 2. Narration-statement of situations vital to comprehending the topic at hand
- 3. Proposition-orator's dominant idea or thesis
- 4. Division-speaker's outline of concepts to illustrate
- 5. Confirmation-bodies of evidence supporting speaker's beliefs
- 6. Rebuttal-an antagonist's potential disagreement with evidence
- 7. Conclusion-synopsis of evidence and last appeal to audience's emotions

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited

- Cicero, Marcus T. De Oratore. (Publishing info. unknown)
- Clarke, M. L. The Roman Mind. New York: W. W. Norton and Inc., 1968.
- Covino and Jolliffe. *Rhetoric*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.
- Hiz, H. "Cicero". The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. P. Edwards. New York: Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1967: 113-114.
- Rolfe. Cicero and His Influence. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1932.
- Siegel, Jerrold. *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.

This page was authored by <u>Maria Rinaldi</u> of the <u>Georgia Institute of Technology</u>. This page was last updated on November 29, 1995.

ISOCRATES

One of the Ten Attic Orators, Isocrates made significant contributions to the development of rhetoric theory and education in Ancient Greece. His writings are essential to understanding Fourth Century BC politics and scholarship. Isocrates was an ardent believer in the ethical obligations of the rhetor, and he devoted his life to educating young Athenians to become better citizens through their use of rhetoric.

Isocrates' Life

Isocrates led a politically active life to his death, never neglecting the importance of rhetoric education for Greece's youth. He was born to a wealthy Athenian family in 436 BC and studied under Socrates and Gorgias. In his Phaedrus, Plato described Isocrates as "a youth of great promise." Isocrates fled Athens during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants and operated a small school of rhetoric on the island of Chios. He returned to Athens in 403 BC, finding employment as a locographer (Isocrates, 1993).

In 393 BC, Isocrates opened the first permanent institution of higher liberal arts education. His school taught the arts of writing essays and of oratory; it drew young men from all over the Greek-speaking world. The subject matter was topical political issues, and he focused on the morality of these topics. Pupils of Isocrates included the orators Hyperides, Isaeus, and Lycurgus, the historians Ephorus and Theopompus, and the general Timotheus (Isocrates, 1993). Isocrates remained for nearly fifty years the most famous, influential, and successful teacher of aspiring young Athenian men (Ford, 1993). Bewildered by Greece losing its independence, however, Isocrates died in 338 BC from self-inflicted starvation (Isocrates, 1993).

Isocrates' Ideas

Isocrates' teaching methods at his school of oratory dominated the rhetorical techniques of Ancient Greece and later influenced European liberal education. To his school, Isocrates only admitted students who had already mastered grammar's stylistic aspects (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990). He established the typical training orations to which his students responded to encompass diverse imaginary situations (Raubitschek, 1994); his classes then examined the issues in political philosophy that the speeches would incite (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990). Roman rhetorician <u>Cicero</u> reported Isocrates' style of teaching oratory through his writings, and it became the standard of excellence for rhetoric education in Europe until the Renaissance (Raubitschek, 1994).

Perhaps due to his own poor speaking abilities, Isocrates believed that rhetoric was meant to be read rather than delivered. The rhetoric he taught, consequently, exhibited precise vocabulary, few figures of speech, and many illustrations from history and philosophy (Isocrates, 1994). Isocrates thought that a rhetorician should manipulate the style of language to meet his needs. Language could take certain fundamental forms, and "these were to be mixed, shaped, fitted together, in the same way that a painter mixes colors or a sculptor smooths a joint" (Ford, 1993). He was most concerned with "polished expression," as demonstrated by his taking ten years to refine his *Panegyricus* for release (Isocrates, 1994).

Isocrates distinguishes himself from his contemporary rhetoricians by not believing that any general rules

Isocrates

can be applied to rhetoric. As P. Bizzel and B. Herzberg report, Isocrates thought that "all general principles must fail because they screen out the particulars of a given situation, which must be taken into account in all truly good moral and rhetorical decisions" (1990). In this conviction, Isocrates rejects the belief of those who sought absolute truth: Plato and the philosophers (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990).

Despite his dismissal of rhetorical rules, Isocrates considered three factors vital to the development of an effective rhetor (in order of decreasing importance): the student's innate ability, practice in speaking from varied exigencies, and instruction in general principles. The instructor can help develop speaking ability through criticism, but basic aptitude must originate in the student. Varied speaking situations offer practice in versatility, to which the instructor should take the position of a virtuous audience. In the third factor Isocrates appears to contradict himself; here, however, he suggests subordinate "rules of thumb" that arise provisionally from a particular situation (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990).

Other aspects of Isocrates's and Plato's rhetorical theories also diverge. <u>Plato</u> denies that any art of speech could exist besides that of philosophy. He presents this views through Isocrates' teacher and title character <u>Gorgias</u> defending himself as a "craftsman of persuasion" (Ford, 1993), who is forced to concede that if a trained speaker must use his skills for evil purposes, he is to be responsible for the consequences, and not his teacher. Thus, the speaker must understand the subject on which he speaks (Ford, 1993). Plato continues his charges in his <u>Phaedrus</u>, remarking that a mastery of philosophy is a necessary basis for any rhetoric (*Phaedrus*, 1995). Isocrates, on the other hand, asserts that public business is of the greatest significance; the urgency of civic affairs will not wait on the philosopher to resolve his questions of absolute truths. The philosopher's higher obligation is "to educate men for their current affairs, to help them learn to make wise decisions in the face of limited knowledge" (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990). For Plato, consequently, the philosophy of rhetoric is grounded in foundational truths; for Isocrates, its basis is applied intellectualism (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990).

Isocrates' Writings

The majority of Isocrates' speeches were written to be published, rather than spoken, and he is considered responsible for making a literary form of <u>oratory</u> (Covino & Joliffe, 1995). His twenty-one extant speeches all concern the politics of Ancient Greece. Perhaps his most famous work, <u>Panegyricus</u> advocates the unification of Greek city-states against the impending Persian army (Isocrates, 1993).

Isocrates' nine extant letters, however, address a wide variety of topics: education, rhetoric, beauty, and the appeal to leaders (Isocrates, 1993). The two works revealing the most about Isocrates' rhetorical theories are his letters *Against the Sophists* and *Antidosis*.

<u>Against the Sophists</u> announces Isocrates' entry into the field of teaching rhetoric. In this work, he explains his opposition to the rhetoric taught by the rival to his school, <u>Plato's</u> Academy, and to the oversimplified rhetorical techniques advanced by contemporary <u>sophists</u> (Covino & Joliffe, 1995).

At eighty-two years old, Isocrates defended himself and his profession through <u>Antidosis</u>. He presents the arguments as if he were responding to the charge that he had corrupted young men "by teaching them to speak and gain their own advantage in the courts contrary to justice" (Antidosis). Antidosis explains Isocrates' beliefs in the ethical obligation of rhetors and the factors imperative for effective rhetoric (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990).

Isocrates

Isocrates' focus concerned not the development of rhetorical theory, but the development of effective leaders for Greece. The rhetor's community has a claim on him that the rhetor cannot refuse; he must endeavor always to be an effective citizen and to make effective citizens of others. Isocrates, therefore, would have felt his purpose fulfilled had he read Cicero's *De Oratore*: "Then behold! There arose Isocrates, the Master of all from whose school, as from the Horse of Troy, none but leaders emerged" (Bizzel & Herzberg, 1990).

୦୭୭୭

Works Cited

- Antidosis. URL: http://the-tech.mit.edu/Classics/Isocrates/isoc.15.sum.html.
- Bizzel, P., & Herzberg, B. (Eds.). (1990). *The Rhetorical Tradition*. Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press.
- Covino, W. J., & Joliffe D. A. (Eds.). (1995). *Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Ford, A. (1993). The Price of Art in Isocrates: Formalism and the Escape from Politics. In T. Poulakos (Ed.), *Rethinking the History of Rhetoric: Multidisciplinary Essays on the Rhetorical Tradition* (pp. 31-52). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Isocrates. (1993). In *Microsoft Encarta '94* [Computer Software]. Microsoft Corporation. CD-ROM.
- Isocrates. (1994). In The New Encyclopedia Britannica Micropedia.
- Phaedrus. (1995). URL: http://the-tech. mit.edu/Classics/Plato/phaedrus.body.html.
- Raubitschek, A. E. Isocrates. In B. Johnson (Ed.), *Collier's Encyclopedia* (pp. 319-320). New York: P. F. Collier.

This page was authored by <u>Todd Evans</u> at the <u>Georgia Institute of Technology</u>. It was last updated on 1 December 1995.

GORGIAS

Gorgias was born in the town of Leontini on the island of Sicily. He is said to have lived for more than 100 years possibly between the years of 480 BC and 376 BC. It is believed that Gorgias went to Athens in 427 BC at the head of a delegation from his town. He caused a stir with his new rhetorical <u>style</u>. He was a great orator and made a handsome sum through the fees he charged for speaking (McGraw - Hill 479). Gorgias, although not overly wealthy earned more than any other sophist, because he lived a long life, lacked a family to support, and wandered too much to be liable for taxes in any city (The Rhetorical Tradition). Some honors he received were invitations for funeral orations at Athens and to speak on Hellenic unity at Olympia. Two well known pupils of Gorgias were Thucydides and Isocrates. Gorgias never married and left no direct descendants (McGraw - Hill 480).

Contributions to Rhetoric and Philosophy

Plato recognized Gorgias as a professional teacher of the art of persuasion as the means to political success. Plato depicts Gorgias as a teacher of rhetoric in his play "Gorgias" (Edwards 374). Gorgias was a <u>sophist</u> and a rhetorician. Gorgias was known as the father of all sophists (Enos 38). He regarded the art of rhetoric superior to all arts (Edwards 375).

Gorgias wrote many literary pieces during his lifetime. Gorgias's writings are comprised of speeches and essays of which some excerpts have survived. These excerpts exhibit the distinctive technical style for which Gorgias was famous (Edwards 375). One of those books, the Handbook to Rhetoric, is now lost. Supposedly in this book Gorgias had strong theoretical arguments for the power of logos. In this book Gorgias is said to prove that the effect of his rhetorical innovations can be seen by the successes of speaker and teacher (McGraw - Hill 480). Gorgias believed that words aquire their own meaning, because they are not connected by the bonds of being anything but themselves. Words become open to each and every meaning and hence become meaningless. It is here then that Gorgias states that words are the vehicle of suggestion, persuasion, and belief. Gorgias feels that rhetoric is precisely the art of producing these words and can be said to be the art of persuasion (Reale 169).

Gorgias is well known for his unique rhetorical <u>epistemology</u>. Gorgias utilized a form of oratory bound by meter which he inherited from a former teacher (Enos 40). He says that oratory should make lavish use of poetic diction, with symmetrical clauses, various rhythms, and musical effects. Some have critisized Gorgias' style as overly alliterative and assonant in sound, but this is countered by the spellbinding effect that Gorgias had on his audiences (Bizzel and Herzberg 38). The exact details of Gorgias' rhetorical theory were probably of great importance, but they cannot be recovered because the book is lost (McGraw - Hill 481).

Gorgias was also known as somewhat of a philosopher. His main contribution to philosophy lies in the contents of his essay "On Nature". His main points in his essay "On Nature" are:

- Nothing Exists
- If anything does exist, it is unknowable
- If anything can be known, knowledge of it is incommunicable

Gorgias

Gorgias believes that no truths exist and that everything is false. His essay can be interpreted as involving a skeptical denial of all existence, but Gorgias is not discussing existence in the physical world. He is discussing concepts of the mind. Gor gias demonstrates that there are things thought, that is, contents of thought which do not have any reality and therefore do not exist (Reale 166). Gorgias proves this with the following:

"That the things thought which are non-existent is plain; for if the things tought are existent, all the things thought exist, and in this way too in which one has thought them. But this is contrary to sense. For if someone thinks of a man flying over the sea, it does not follow at once that a man is flying over the sea. So that the things thought are not existent [= the thought is not a thoguht of being] "(Reale 167).

Gorgias is saying that "ideals attain existence only through the extrapolations of the mind, and are dependent upon the referential perceptions of the reader" (Enos 47). Gorgias' stated that for something to be understood it must be experienced. What Gorgias really means is that man is incapable of understanding exactly what someone else is trying to communicate to them, and therefore no conceptual ideas actually exist.

ତତତତ

Works Cited

Bizzel, Patricia and Herzberg, Bruce, Ed. The Rhetorical Tradition. St. Martin's Press, New York. 1990

Edwards, Paul, Ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol 3. Macmillian Co and Free Press, New York

Enos, Richard Leo. The Epistomology of Gorgias' Rhetoric: A Re-examination. The Southern Speech Communication Journal, 42 (Fall 1976), 35-51.

McGraw - Hill, The encyclopedia of World Biography. Vol 4. New York, 1973

The Province of Rhetoric. pg 78-79

Reale, Giovanni. From the Origins to Socrates. State University of New York Press, Albany, New York. 1987

This page was authored by <u>Maggie Babyak</u> of the <u>Georgia Institute of Technology</u>. It was last updated on Wednesday, 29 November, 1995.

RHETORIC & EPISTEMOLOGY

Epistemology is derived from the Greek words *episteme*, which means knowledge, and *logos*, which means theory. It is the branch of philosophy that addresses the philosophical problems surrounding the theory of knowledge. It answers many questions concerning what knowledge is, how it is obtained, and what makes it knowledge. Many prominent philosophers with ideas on epistemology also dealt with rhetoric. This page will attempt to link epistemology to rhetoric.

History of Epistemology

In the 5th century BC, the Greek <u>Sophists</u> questioned the possibility of reliable and objective knowledge. A leading sophist, <u>Gorgias</u>, argued that nothing really exists, that if anything did exist it could not be known, and that if knowledge were possible, it could not be communicated. <u>Plato</u>, following his teacher Socrates, believed that there existed a world of unchanging and invisible ideas about which it is possible to have exact and certain knowledge. They believed that tangible things are imperfect copies of the pure forms studied in mathematics and philosophy.

Aristotle agreed with Plato in regarding abstract knowledge as superior to any other, but disagreed with him as to the proper method of achieving it . He believed that all knowledge is gained from experience, in accordance with the rules of logic.

After many centuries of declining interest in rational and scientific knowledge, Saint Thomas Aquinas and other philosophers of the Middle Ages stressed confidence in reason and experience, combining logic with faith into a unified system of beliefs. Aquinas agreed with Aristotle in regarding experience as the starting point and logic as the method of arriving at reliable knowledge of nature, but he considered belief in scripture as the main basis of religious belief.

From the 17th to the late 19th century, the main issue in epistemology was logic versus experience in obtaining knowledge. For the rationalists, such as the French philosopher Rene Descartes, the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and the German philosopher Gottfried von Leibniz, the main source of knowledge was deductive reasoning based on self-evident ideas. For the empiricists, such as the English philosophers Francis Bacon and John Locke, the main source of knowledge was experience.

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant tried to solve an argument between Locke and a British philosopher named David Hume; his proposed solution combined elements of rationalism with elements of empiricism. He agreed with rationalist belief that one can have exact and certain knowledge, but he followed empiricist ideas in saying that such knowledge is more informative about the structure of thought than about the world outside of thought. During the 19th century, philosophers such as G. W. F. Hegel, Herbert Spencer, Auguste Comte, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey continued to elaborate on the same two schools of thought. In the 20th century, German philosopher Edmund Husserl, and Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein continued to argue the ideas of epistemology.

Greek Philosophers With Views on Rhetoric and Epistemology

Epistemic rhetoric has historical antecedents that extend back to the Greek sophists Protagoras and Gorgias.(Covino 49)

<u>Gorgias</u> was a Greek Sophist and rhetorician and a supporter of skepticism. Skepticism, which comes from the Greek word *skeptesthai*, meaning "to examine", denies the possibility of attaining knowledge of reality as it is in itself, apart from human experience. Throughout time, the word skepticism has also come to signify doubt about what is generally accepted as true. All philosophical skepticism is ultimately epistemological; it is based on views about the scope and validity of human knowledge. The Greek Sophists of the 5th century BC were for the most part skeptics. Their point of view is reflected in their maxims "Man is the measure of all things" and "Nothing is; or if anything is, it cannot be known." Thus, Gorgias declared that all statements concerning reality are false and that, even if true, their truth can never be proved.(Abelson)

The ideas of skepticism were first formulated by the Pyrrhonists, a school of Greek philosophy deriving its name from its founder, Pyrrho of Elis. They believed that "human beings can know nothing of the real nature of things, and that consequently the wise person will suspend judgment." (Abelson) Timon of Philius, Pyrrho's pupil, carried skepticism to its logical conclusion by concluding that equally good reasons can be found both for and against any philosophical idea.

The school that developed in the 3rd century BC from Plato's Academy, known as the Middle Academy, and the New Academy of Carneades supported the idea that no beliefs can be proved conclusively but that some can be shown to be more probable than others. The most important skeptics later were the Greek philosopher Aenesidemus, who classified ten arguments in support of the skeptical position, and the Greek physician Sextus Empiricus, who emphasized observation and common sense as opposed to theory.

Protagoras of Abdera, another Sophist, believed that human beings can know only their perceptions of things, not the things themselves. Not only was he a sophist, he was the first philosopher to call himself a Sophist and to teach for pay, receiving large sums from his pupils. He gave instruction in grammar, rhetoric, and the interpretation of poetry. His chief works were *Truth* and *On the Gods*. The basis of his speculation was the doctrine that nothing is absolutely good or bad, true or false, and that each individual is therefore his or her own final authority; this belief is summed up in his saying: "Man is the measure of all things."

Epistemology in Rhetoric

Epistemic rhetoric is the body of rhetorical theory maintaining that the truth conveyed by a text neither exists outside the rhetorical situation that generates the discourse nor dwells immanently within the speaker or writer. Instead, epistemic rhetoric holds that truth is forged via negotiation, is generated by the transaction among the speaker/writer, the listener/reader, and the constraints of the particular rhetorical situation. (Covino 49) Epistemology is important to rhetoric because rhetoric involves communication between two people and, therefore, the exchange of knowledge. But, in order to exchange knowledge, one must know what knowledge is and why it is knowledge.

୦୦୦୦

Works Cited

Abelson, Raziel "Epistemology" Microsoft Encarta '95. Microsoft Corporation, 1994

Covino, William A. and David A. Jolliffe, eds. *Rhetoric Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries.* Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995.

Duckworth, George E. "Protagoras" Microsoft Encarta '95. Microsoft Corporation, 1994

Edwards, Paul, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Fetzer, James H. Glossary of Epistemology; Philosophy of Science. New York: Paragon House, 1993.

Stough, Charlotte L. *Greek Skepticism; A Study in Epistemology*. Berkely: University of California Press, 1969.

Urmson, J.O. and Ree, J. eds. *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

This page was authored by <u>Nathan T. Floyd</u> of the <u>Georgia Institute of Technology</u>. It was last updated on Wednesday, November 29, 1995.


Page Not Found

Page Not Found?

You may be able to find what you were looking for at:

- The Internet Classics Archive
- <u>Chemicool Periodic Table</u>
- <u>The Complete Works of William Shakespeare</u>

The Complete Works of William Shakespeare



Welcome to the Web's first edition of the Complete Works of William Shakespeare. This site has offered Shakespeare's plays and poetry to the Internet community since 1993.

Announcement: The restoration of the site following a disk failure has been delayed. The text of the plays is available now. The poetry and other services, including the search engine and forums, will return shortly. (Nov. 13, 2000)

For other Shakespeare resources, visit the <u>Mr.</u> <u>William Shakespeare and the Internet</u> Web site.

The original electronic source for this server is the <u>Complete Moby(tm) Shakespeare</u>, which is freely available online. The HTML versions of the plays provided here are placed in the public domain.

Older news items

Comedy	History	Tragedy	Poetry
All's Well That Ends Well As You Like It The Comedy of Errors Cymbeline Love's Labours Lost Measure for Measure The Merry Wives of Windsor The Merry Wives of Windsor The Merchant of Venice A Midsummer Night's Dream Much Ado About Nothing Pericles, Prince of Tyre Taming of the Shrew The Tempest Troilus and Cressida Twelfth Night Two Gentlemen of Verona	Henry IV, part 1 Henry IV, part 2 Henry V Henry VI, part 1 Henry VI, part 2 Henry VI, part 3 Henry VIII King John Richard II Richard III	Antony and Cleopatra Coriolanus Hamlet Julius Caesar King Lear Macbeth Othello Romeo and Juliet Timon of Athens Titus Andronicus	The Sonnets A Lover's Complaint The Rape of Lucrece Venus and Adonis Funeral Elegy by W.S.

http://tech-two.mit.edu/Shakespeare/ (1 of 2) [07/31/2001 7:29:10 PM]

The Complete Works of William Shakespeare

W	<i>'in</i>	ter	's [Fale	Э

Created by <u>Jeremy Hylton</u>, <jeremy@alum.mit.edu> Operated by <u>The Tech</u>, MIT's oldest and largest newspaper

Bodyless Communication:

Ethos and the World Wide Web

an online project by Susan Fielding, James Hetfield, and Lynn Whitaker

Classical Rhetoric and Aristotle

Aristotle defined rhetoric as "an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the availible means of persuasion." (Aristotle 36) He then divided the means of persuasion into two categories: atechnic and entechnic pisteis. Atechnic pisteis are those external to argumentation, i.e. blackmail or threats. Entechnic pisteis are the means of persuasuion internal to an argument: logos, pathos, and ethos.


Categories of Entechnic of Pisteis

Logos

The main concern in an argumentation-persuasion presentation should be

with the logos, or soundness, of your argument. This includes the facts, statistics, examples, and authoritative statements you gather to support your viewpoint. This supporting evidence must be unified, specific, sufficient, accurate, and representative. Imagine, for instance, you want to convince people that a popular charity misappropriates the money it receives from the public. Your readers, inclined to believe in the good works of the charity, will probably dismiss evidence that enhances your position unless your reasoning, or Logos, is very sound.

Pathos



Sensitivity to the pathos, or the emotional power of language, is another key consideration for creators of argumentation-persuasion presentations. Pathos appeals to a viewpoint or course of action. The pathos of a piece derives partly from the communicators choice of language. Connotative language, for example, are words with strong emotional overtones and have the ability to move the audience to accept a point of view and may even spur them to act. Adolf Hitler, during World War II, was very effective with the use of propaganda filled with elements of pathos in order to convince the country and rally support for his cause.



Ethos

Finally, whenever presenting any argument or persuasion, the establishment of ethos, or credibility and reliability is very important. The audience cannot be expected to accept or act on your viewpoint unless you convince them that you know what you're talking about and that you're worth listening to. You will come across as knowledgeable and trustworthy if you present a logical, reasoned argument that takes opposing views into account. It is also important to make sure that the appeals to emotion are not excessive. Too much emotionalism tends to undercut credibility.

The delivery of any good argumentation-persuasion presentation involves an interplay of logos, pathos, and ethos. The exact balance among these factors is determined by the audience and purpose, that is, whether or not you want the audience simply to agree with your view or whether you also want them to take action. For the execution of this, the presentation should be tailored to the audience and its needs. How much the audience knows about the issue, how they feel about you and your position, what their values and attitudes are, and what motivates them should all be taken into account.

Ethos in Cyberspace

The World Wide Web(WWW), a confluence of improving technology and information, has a sheer volume problem in which ethos, a primary component of classical rhetoric, is missing. The absence of traditional establishment of ethos causes people to fall into situations in which they are fundamentally deficient. To engage in an argument on the WWW without consideration of ethos is akin to passing gossip, only in this situation the "wildfire" of information has ample fuel and space in which to grow. The problem of overabundant information on the WWW is enhanced by the desire of most computer users to read and process information. Kenneth Burke elucidates an analogous problem in his book, "Counter-Statement," on page 53:

"And, if it is a form of self-expression to utter our emotions, it is just as truly a form of self-expression to provoke emotions in others, if we happen to prefer such a practice, even though the emotions aimed at were not the predominant emotion of our own lives."

Internet communication technologies allow users in many different geographic locations to meet online in a virtual space. However, these bodyless forms of communication are intrinsically pseudonymous. Identities created in this virtual space do not have to conform to a user's real identity, and often , due to both distance and privacy concerns, one is unable to dicover the real world identity of an online persona. The absence of traditional means for establishing identity requires that we sharpen our language skills and develop new methods for establishing and evaluating ethos in these communication channels.

Burke realizes that people fail to utilize critical reading and writing practices in their interpretation of information. This occurs now on the WWW. People 'surf' without giving any thought to the information encountered.People cannot be intimidated by the large amount of work required by this new literacy.

Government regulation of information is one possible solution. This is an uphill battle against the average computer user and the belief, as Laura Gurak elucidates, that "individuals are against most forms of gate keeping in cyberspace and instead rely on what they see as the self-regulating mechanism of the net community to weed out false or unwarranted information" (Gurak 84). This is a formidable communication obstacle on its own, but coupled with the expedience of email and search engines, the potential miscommunication increases. Ethos does not exist for the most part on the WWW.

Why is ethos so important? It is a cornerstone of classical rhetoric, for, "the speakers and their messages are often considered the most important feature in rhetoric, because if audiences do not trust a speaker, they will probably not listen to his or her message" (Gurak 84). A successful speaker makes eye contact and uses various cadences of speech. The speaker also uses gestures. Most importantly, the speaker is able to make major or minor adjustments in their discourse as an examination of the audience warrants. In other words, the speaker is able to increase ethos upon analysis of the audience.

The above tenets of classical rhetoric are missing from the WWW. Body gestures? Missing. Cadences? Non-existent, due to the flexible and most forgiving interface known as the keyboard. Eye contact? Blank. The problem of sheer volume and WWW information collides seamlessly. Any person without regard to ethos can place information on the WWW without fear of rejection. In classical rhetoric a conveyance of confidence is instrumental in ethos establishment. Without web ethos, persuasion towards information seekers is whittled down to a sort of visual appeasement, mainly with colorful graphics, sound, and rampant use of large fonts. The enticement of WWW information seekers is also analogous to the problem of television 'surfers.' Volume of information on the WWW is coupled with the ingrained tendency to 'web surf,' or the act of a computer user to briefly visit several sites in rapid sequence. Cable TV and remote controls only enhance this deficiency. This has amplified the lack of critical analysis which is required in order to generate feasible judgments of data. Critical reading and writing skills could provide web surfers the skills required to successfully 'surf' the WWW.

For traditional text, critical reading and writing skills contain two components. The first, functional print literacy, is defined by the ability to read and write in a particular language (class notes, 8/24/99), and critical print literacy, the ability to understand and comprehend a particular language (class notes, 8/24/99). The advent of the Internet has produced two more regions of literacy. First, functional digital literacy, which encompasses the ability to send and receive email, access and compose web sites, and the ability to understand HTML as well as the ability to read and write effective email and web sites (class notes, 8/24/99). Here, then, are four regions of literacy which must be completely combined in order for web users to utilize and understand the vast information of the WWW.

Some Automated Solutions

Despite the many problematic aspects of WWW based communication, it is growing daily in importance and so, therefore, is the need to find solutions to the challenges involved. Many are turning to the computer for these solutions and attempting to build systems for establishing ethos into the communication channel itself. These computerized rhetorical tools include:

- verified logins- limiting the freedom of users to change pseudonyms by varifying their identity
- rating systems- "Ethos Quotients" which establish a numerical reification of community opinion
- history databases- records of past activity in electronic forums
- user biography collections- online spaces where real world identities can be attached to pseudonymous ones.

These are just a few of the tools that have been developed to help WWW users establish ethos for themselves and determine the ethos of others. Here we analize three web sites that use these and other techniques to help bring identity to the bodyless online world.

Epinions.com is a non-profit online database of comsumer opinions. Covering everything from Stephen King books to Caribbean vacations, Epinions seeks to provide readers with product reviews written by other readers. It is important for Epinions to help its readers establish the ethos of other readers to let them decide which reviews to trust. Epinions.com uses verified user logins, user biographies and a system of reader evaluations to establish "Webs of Trust"

Click here for our analysis of Epinions



Ebay.com allows users to participate in online auctions, putting buyers and sellers from all over the world in touch with each other. Ebay brokers the sale to the point of exchange of money and items, which happens directly between the buyer and seller. Establish the reputation of buyers and sellers is especially important on Ebay due to the constant exchange of money for goods. Ebay uses verified user logins, a user history database, and user ratings to allow Ebay users to establish and examine the Ethos of other Ebay users.

Click here for our analysis of Ebay



Slashdot.org is an online news index that allows readers to leave comments on news articles from elsewhere on the WWW. Due to the high volume of user comments, slashdot has introduced a filtering

system which allows users to choose a relevence threshold underwhich to ignore posts. Moderators rate comments for relevence and moderators are randomly chosen based on their "karma", a automatically established numerical rating representing their history of posting relevant comments.

Click here for our analysis of slashdot

Go To References

On Rhetoric 1.1-3

"What is Rhetoric?"

Commentary

CONTENTS

- <u>What is Rhetoric? (1.1-3)</u>
 - o Introduction (1.1)
 - o Definition of Rhetoric (1.2)
 - o Genres of Rhetoric (1.3)
- Suggestions for Further Reading

What is Rhetoric? (1.1-3)

A. <u>Introduction</u> (1.1)

- In the fist sentence of *On Rhetoric* we read that "rhetoric is the counterpart (*antistrophos*) to dialectic." (1354a) But what exactly does this mean?
- It is first important to note that Aristotle divides all of the known sciences in four categories:
 - 1. Theoretical Sciences: mathematics, physics, theology
 - 2. Practical Arts: politics and ethics
 - 3. Productive Arts: fine arts, crafts, medicine
 - 4. Tools: dialectics, rhetoric
- A tool (organum) for Aristotle is something that has....
 - 1. no subject matter of its own
 - 2. is applicable to all other subjects
- Rhetoric as the **counterpart** (*antistrophos*) to dialectic:
 - Dialectic are formal logical debates on various subjects that were performed at Aristotle's Lyceum:
 - "The procedure in dialectic was for one student to state a thesis (e.g., "Pleasure is the only good") and for a second student to try to refute this by asking a series of questions that could be answered by *yes* or *no*. If successful, the interlocutor led the respondent into a contradiction or logically undefensible position by means of definition and division of the question or by drawing analogies; however, the respondent might be able to defend his position and win the argument." (Kennedy, *Aristotle* 26)

- o similarities
 - both rhetoric and dialects, then, are tool that are useful in other disciplines
 - concerned with subjects in the common realm of knowledge, not specialized sciences
- o differences:

Dialectic	Rhetoric				
proceeds by means of question and answer	uses continuous exposition				
only logical arguments used	uses any and all means of persuasion				
deals with general/philosophical questions	deals with concrete/practical questions				
(e.g., nature of justice)	(e.g., was this action just?)				

- Rhetoric as an **art (techne)**:
 - o an art is "a body of knowledge used for a particular end."
 - o examples:

Art	End						
dialectic	arguing soundly						
politics	creating a harmonious social order						
carpentry	creating beautiful/useful objects out of wood						

 \circ end of rhetoric = to persuade an audience

• Why is Rhetoric Useful? (1355a-b)

- o to advance the cause of justice and truth
 - think of the rhetoric used by M.L. King for example during the civil rights movement
- o to persuade the masses
 - most human beings can't be persuaded by means of logic or scientific explanations. One, therefore, needs to use more subtle (e.g., rhetorical) means to persuade them.
- to argue both sides of an issue
 - this is a particularly useful way to train you to to recognize and be able to defeat vicious argument. If you are a liberal, for example, try arguing a position held by Rush Limbaugh.
- o to defend yourself against verbal attacks
 - if you were being assaulted physically, you would defend yourself, wouldn't you? You should do no less when you are being attacked verbally.



B. Definition of Rhetoric (1.2)

- **rhetoric** = "the ability (*dynamis*) of observing in any given case (*peri hekaston*) the available means of persuasion (*pisteis*)."
 - o dynamis: ability, power; capacity, faculty
 - *peri hekaston*: rhetoric always deals with concrete situations and circumstances (vs dialectic)
 - o pisteis: derived from the Greek verb "pisteuo," meaning "I trust"
- *pisteis*: the **means of persuasion** used in rhetoric fall into three categories
 - 1. those derived from the good character (*ethos*) of the speaker.
 - 2. those derived from the emotions (pathos) of the audience.
 - 3. those derived from the validity of arguments (logos) used.
- therefore the successful rhetor needs to understand:
 - 1. ethics: the study of human character
 - 2. psychology: the study of emotional states
 - 3. <u>logic</u>: the study of argumentation



C. Three Genres of Rhetoric (1.3)

- Aristotle outlines three different genres of rhetoric that correspond to the different audiences that one is addressing. The members of **one's audience** will likely be one of the following:
 - 1. judge or jury: has to make a decision about some event now past (was it just or unjust?)
 - 2. <u>legislator or voter</u>: has to make a decision about some future action (is it advantageous or disadvantageous?
 - 3. <u>spectator</u>: has to make a judgment about an individual's character (is noble or shameful?)
- Based upon this description of the three different types of audiences, Aristotle then describes the end (*telos*) of each of the three different **genres of rhetoric**:
 - 1. <u>Forensic Rhetoric</u>: aims at persuading an audience that a particular past action was just or unjust (e.g., Trial Speech)
 - 2. <u>Deliberative Rhetoric</u>: aims at persuading an audience that a future action is advantageous or disadvantageous (e.g., Political Speech)

3. <u>Epideitic Rhetoric</u>: aims at persuading an audience that a particular subject/individual is noble or base. (e.g., Funeral/Pulpit Oration)

Genre of Rhetoric	Audience	Time	Ends	Means		
Forensic	judge or jury	past	just/unjust action	accusation/defense		
Deliberative	legislator or voter	future	advant./disadvant. action	persuasion/dissuasion		
Epideitic	spectator	present	noble/base subject	praise/blame		



Suggestions for Further Reading

- Cope, E.M. An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric. London: MacMillan, 1867.
- Garver, Euguene. Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1994.
- Hill, Forbes, "The Amorality of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 22 (1981): 133-147.
- Kennedy, George A., trans. and intro. Aristotle: On Rhetoric. New York: Oxford UP, 1991.
- ---. *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition*. 2nd ed. Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999.
- Lanigan, Richard L. "Enthymeme: The Rhetorical Species of Aristotle's Syllogism." *Southern Speech Communication Speech Communication Journal* 39 (1974): 207-222.
- Rorty, Amelie O, ed. Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1996.
- Rowland, Robert C. and Womack, Deanna F. "Aristotle's View of Ethical Rhetoric." *Rhetoric Society Quartely* 15.1-2 (1985): 13-31.
- Self, Lois S. "Rhetoric and Phronesis: The Aristotelian Ideal." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 12 (1979): 130-145.

Department of Philosophy Home Page | Sophia Project Home Page | Aristotle Page

© 2000, M. Russo For more information contact: <u>mrusso@molloy.edu</u>



Book I - Chapter 3

Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making -- speaker, subject, and person addressed -- it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. **[1358b]** The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to make guesses at the future.

Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this one.

That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would be no need of a trial. So too, political orators often make any concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The question whether it is not *unjust* for a city to enslave its innocent neighbours often does not trouble them at all. In like manner those who praise or censure a man do not consider **[1359a]** whether his acts have been expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus, though he knew that this meant death, and that otherwise he need not die: yet

Aristotle's Rhetoric: Book I - Chapter 3

while to die thus was the nobler thing for him to do, the expedient thing was to live on.

It is evident from what has been said that it is these three subjects, more than any others, about which the orator must be able to have propositions at his command. Now the propositions of Rhetoric are Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs. Every kind of syllogism is composed of propositions, and the enthymeme is a particular kind of syllogism composed of the aforesaid propositions.

Since only possible actions, and not impossible ones, can ever have been done in the past or the present, and since things which have not occurred, or will not occur, also cannot have been done or be going to be done, it is necessary for the political, the forensic, and the ceremonial speaker alike to be able to have at their command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not occur. Further, all men, in giving praise or blame, in urging us to accept or reject proposals for action, in accusing others or defending themselves, attempt not only to prove the points mentioned but also to show that the good or the harm, the honour or disgrace, the justice or injustice, is great or small, either absolutely or relatively; and therefore it is plain that we must also have at our command propositions about greatness or smallness and the greater or the lesser -- propositions both universal and particular. Thus, we must be able to say which is the greater or lesser good, the greater or lesser act of justice or injustice; and so on.

Such, then, are the subjects regarding which we are inevitably bound to master the propositions relevant to them. We must now discuss each particular class of these subjects in turn, namely those dealt with in political, in ceremonial, and lastly in legal, oratory.

<u>Next Chapter / Previous Chapter / Book II / Book III / Bibliography / Main Index Page</u>

A hypertextual resource compiled by Lee Honeycutt (honeyl@iastate.edu)



Book I - Chapter 2

Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned with any special or definite class of subjects.

Of the modes of persuasion some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By the latter I mean such things as are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset -- witnesses, evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former I mean such as we can ourselves construct by means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other has to be invented.

[1356a] Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.

There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as political science, and the professors of it as political experts-sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation, sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it

```
Aristotle's Rhetoric: Book I - Chapter 2
```

is a branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset. Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are related to each other.

With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or [1356b] apparent proof: just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and this is clear to us from the Analytics), it must follow that enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the Methodics applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some orators are better at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next step is to define the processes themselves more clearly.

A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any or all of a given class of patients: this alone is business: individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given type; and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate. **[1357a]** The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning. The subjects of our deliberation are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his time in deliberation.

It is possible to form syllogisms and draw conclusions from the results of previous syllogisms; or, on the other hand, from premisses which have not been thus proved, and at the same time are so little accepted that they call for proof. Reasonings of the former kind will necessarily be hard to follow owing to their length, for we assume an audience of untrained thinkers; those of the latter kind will fail to win assent, because they are based on premisses that are not generally admitted or believed.

The enthymeme and the example must, then, deal with what is in the main contingent, the example being an induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, about such matters. The enthymeme must consist of few

propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say "For he has been victor in the Olympic games," without adding "And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown," a fact which everybody knows.

There are few facts of the "necessary" type that can form the basis of rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make decisions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire, and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are determined by necessity. Again, conclusions that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the same, just as 'necessary' conclusions must be drawn from "necessary" premisses; this too is clear to us from the Analytics . It is evident, therefore, that the propositions forming the basis of enthymemes, though some of them may be "necessary," will most of them be only usually true. Now the materials of enthymemes are Probabilities and Signs, which we can see must correspond respectively with the propositions that are generally and those that are necessarily true. A Probability is a thing that usually happens; not, however, as some definitions would suggest, anything whatever that usually happens, but only if it belongs to the class of the "contingent" or "variable." It bears the same relation to that in respect of which it is probable as the universal bears to the particular. [1357b] Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a "complete proof" (tekmerhiou); the fallible kind has no specific name. By infallible signs I mean those on which syllogisms proper may be based: and this shows us why this kind of Sign is called "complete proof": when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they then think that they are bringing forward a "complete proof," meaning that the matter has now been demonstrated and completed (peperhasmeuou); for the word perhas has the same meaning (of "end" or "boundary") as the word tekmarh in the ancient tongue. Now the one kind of Sign (that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of particular to universal) may be illustrated thus. Suppose it were said, "The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just." Here we certainly have a Sign; but even though the proposition be true, the argument is refutable, since it does not form a syllogism. Suppose, on the other hand, it were said, "The fact that he has a fever is a sign that he is ill," or, "The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child." Here we have the infallible kind of Sign, the only kind that constitutes a complete proof, since it is the only kind that, if the particular statement is true, is irrefutable. The other kind of Sign, that which bears to the proposition it supports the relation of universal to particular, might be illustrated by saying, "The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever." This argument also is refutable, even if the statement about the fast breathing be true, since a man may breathe hard without having a fever.

It has, then, been stated above what is the nature of a Probability, of a Sign, and of a complete proof, and what are the differences between them. In the Analytics a more explicit description has been given of these points; it is there shown why some of these reasonings can be put into syllogisms and some cannot.

The "example" has already been described as one kind of induction; and the special nature of the subject-matter that distinguishes it from the other kinds has also been stated above. Its relation to the proposition it supports is not that of part to whole, nor whole to part, nor whole to whole, but of part to part, or like to like. When two statements are of the same order, but one is more familiar than the other, the former is an "example." The argument may, for instance, be that Dionysius, in asking as he does for a bodyguard, is scheming to make himself a despot. For in the past Peisistratus kept asking for a

Aristotle's Rhetoric: Book I - Chapter 2

bodyguard in order to carry out such a scheme, and did make himself a despot as soon as he got it; and so did Theagenes at Megara; and in the same way all other instances known to the speaker are made into examples, in order to show what is not yet known, that Dionysius has the same purpose in making the same request: all these being instances of the one general principle, that a man who asks for a bodyguard is scheming to make himself a despot. **[1358a]** We have now described the sources of those means of persuasion which are popularly supposed to be demonstrative.

There is an important distinction between two sorts of enthymemes that has been wholly overlooked by almost everybody -- one that also subsists between the syllogisms treated of in dialectic. One sort of enthymeme really belongs to rhetoric, as one sort of syllogism really belongs to dialectic; but the other sort really belongs to other arts and faculties, whether to those we already exercise or to those we have not yet acquired. Missing this distinction, people fail to notice that the more correctly they handle their particular subject the further they are getting away from pure rhetoric or dialectic. This statement will be clearer if expressed more fully. I mean that the proper subjects of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are the things with which we say the regular or universal Lines of Argument are concerned, that is to say those lines of argument that apply equally to questions of right conduct, natural science, politics, and many other things that have nothing to do with one another. Take, for instance, the line of argument concerned with 'the more or less'. On this line of argument it is equally easy to base a syllogism or enthymeme about any of what nevertheless are essentially disconnected subjects -- right conduct, natural science, or anything else whatever. But there are also those special Lines of Argument which are based on such propositions as apply only to particular groups or classes of things. Thus there are propositions about natural science on which it is impossible to base any enthymeme or syllogism about ethics, and other propositions about ethics on which nothing can be based about natural science. The same principle applies throughout. The general Lines of Argument have no special subject-matter, and therefore will not increase our understanding of any particular class of things. On the other hand, the better the selection one makes of propositions suitable for special Lines of Argument, the nearer one comes, unconsciously, to setting up a science that is distinct from dialectic and rhetoric. One may succeed in stating the required principles, but one's science will be no longer dialectic or rhetoric, but the science to which the principles thus discovered belong. Most enthymemes are in fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument; comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in the Topics, therefore, so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be founded. By special Lines of Argument I mean the propositions peculiar to each several class of things, by general those common to all classes alike. We may begin with the special Lines of Argument. But, first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions each must employ.

Next Chapter / Previous Chapter / Book II / Book III / Bibliography / Main Index Page

A hypertextual resource compiled by Lee Honeycutt (honeyl@iastate.edu)



Book I - Chapter 1

[1354a] Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

Now, the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is merely accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. Consequently if the rules for trials which are now laid down some states -- especially in well-governed states -- were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say. All men, no doubt, *think* that the laws should prescribe such rules, but some, as in the court of Areopagus, give practical effect to their thoughts and forbid talk about non-essentials. This is sound law and custom. It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity -- one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it. Again, a litigant has clearly nothing to do but to show that the alleged fact is so or is not so, that it has or has not happened. As to whether a thing is important or unimportant, just or unjust, the judge must surely refuse to take his instructions from the litigants: he must decide for himself all such points as the law-giver has not already defined for him.

Now, it is of great moment that well-drawn laws should themselves define all the points they possibly can and leave as few as may be to the decision of the judges; and this for several reasons. First, to find one man, or a few men, who are sensible persons and **[1354b]** capable of legislating and administering justice is easier than to find a large number. Next, laws are made after long consideration, whereas decisions in the courts are given at short notice, which makes it hard for those who try the case to satisfy the claims of justice and expediency. The weightiest reason of all is that the decision of the lawgiver is not particular but prospective and general, whereas members of the assembly and the jury find it *their* duty to decide on definite cases brought before them. They will often have allowed themselves to be so much influenced by feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest that they lose any clear vision of the judge should, we say, be allowed to decide as few things as possible. But questions as to whether something has happened or has not happened, will be or will not be, is or is not, must of necessity be left to the judge, since the lawgiver cannot foresee them. If this is so, it is evident that any one who lays down rules about other matters, such as what must be the contents of the "introduction" or the "narration"

or any of the other divisions of a speech, is theorizing about non-essentials as if they belonged to the art. The only question with which these writers here deal is how to put the judge into a given frame of mind. About the orator's proper modes of persuasion they have nothing to tell us; nothing, that is, about how to gain skill in enthymemes.

Hence it comes that, although the same systematic principles apply to political as to forensic oratory, and although the former is a nobler business, and fitter for a citizen, than that which concerns the relations of private individuals, these authors say nothing about political oratory, but try, one and all, to write treatises on the way to plead in court. The reason for this is that in political oratory there is less inducement to talk about nonessentials. Political oratory is less given to unscrupulous practices than forensic, because it treats of wider issues. In a political debate the man who is forming a judgement is making a decision about his own vital interests. There is no need, therefore, to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are. In forensic oratory this is not enough; to conciliate the listener is what pays here. It is other people's affairs that are to be decided, so that the judges, intent on their own satisfaction and listening with partiality, surrender themselves to the disputants instead of judging between them. **[1355a]** Hence in many places, as we have said already, irrelevant speaking is forbidden in the law-courts: in the public assembly those who have to form a judgement are themselves well able to guard against that.

It is clear, then, that rhetorical study, in its strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion. The enthymeme is a sort of syllogism, and the consideration of syllogisms of all kinds, without distinction, is the business of dialectic, either of dialectic as a whole or of one of its branches. It follows plainly, therefore, that he who is best able to see how and from what elements a syllogism is produced will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

It has now been shown that the ordinary writers on rhetoric treat of non-essentials; it has also been shown why they have inclined more towards the forensic branch of oratory.

Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the Topics when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views.

Aristotle's Rhetoric: Book I - Chapter 1


No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. **[1355b]** Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, *that* is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as universal as dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the means of coming as near such success as the circumstances of each particular case allow. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment even to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and the apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and the apparent syllogism. What makes a man a "sophist" is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. In rhetoric, however, the term "rhetorician" may describe either the speaker's knowledge of the art, or his moral purpose. In dialectic it is different: a man is a "sophist" because he has a certain kind of moral purpose, a "dialectician" in respect, not of his moral purpose, but of his faculty.

Let us now try to give some account of the systematic principles of Rhetoric itself -- of the right method and means of succeeding in the object we set before us. We must make as it were a fresh start, and before going further define what rhetoric is.

Next Chapter / Book II / Book III / Bekker Index / Main Page

A hypertextual resource compiled by Lee Honeycutt (honeyl@iastate.edu)



This site was created by <u>Sherrin Roberts</u>, <u>Robert Sanderson</u> and <u>Chun-yuan Tseng</u>, and is currently owned and maintained by Sherrin Roberts. It was one of many class projects for <u>Humanities 5301</u>, under the instruction of <u>Victor Vitanza</u>. If you'd like more information about the program at <u>UTA</u>, please see the <u>Graduate Humanities</u> page. For more links to useful humanities resources, please see <u>"VVinks."</u> Many thanks to <u>The-Tech at MIT</u> for their on-line archives.









On Argument.

by Peter Landry.1

Introduction





[TOC]

Opening Quotes:

"Freethinkers are those who are willing to use their minds without prejudice and without fearing to understand things that clash with their own customs, privileges, or beliefs. This state of mind is not common, but it is essential for right thinking; where it is absent, discussion is apt to become worse than useless." (Leo Tolstoy.)

"What do you mean by `If you really are a Queen"? What right have you to all yourself so? You can't be a Queen, you know, till you've passed the proper examination. And the sooner we begin it, the better.' `I only said "if"!' poor Alice pleaded in a piteous tone. The two Queens looked at each other, and the Red Queen remarked, with a little shudder, 'She SAYS she only said "if" - ' 'But she said a great deal more than that!' the White Queen moaned, wringing her hands. `Oh, ever so much more than that!' `So you did, you know,' the Red Queen said to Alice. Always speak the truth -- think before you speak -- and write it down afterwards.' `I'm sure I didn't mean -- ' Alice was beginning, but the Red Queen interrupted her impatiently. `That's just what I complain of! You SHOULD have meant! What do you suppose is the use of child without any meaning? Even a joke should have some meaning -- and a child's more important than a joke, I hope. You couldn't deny that, even if you tried with both hands.' `I don't deny things with my HANDS,' Alice objected. `Nobody said you did,' said the Red Queen. 'I said you couldn't if you tried.' 'She's in that state of mind,' said the White Queen, `that she wants to deny SOMETHING -only she doesn't know what to deny!' `A nasty, vicious temper,' the Red Queen remarked; and then there was an uncomfortable silence for a minute or two." (Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, Ch. 9.)

On Argument.

[TOC] Introduction:

We must judge and stand to be judged. It is natural and right that we do so. To judge it incorrectly, when presented with a situation of consequence, or, worse yet, not to judge it at all, will surely lead to an individual's downfall. From the simplest of things in daily living to the most complex of social problems, we are bound to seek and find out the <u>truth</u>; and, once found, to hold onto it and to advance it. In this life sustaining process, we will be obliged to listen to the arguments, and, where necessary, to make them.

But, what is an argument? The OEDII gives a number of definitions: I intend to take up my subject with its third meaning: "A statement or fact advanced for the purpose of influencing the mind; a reason urged in support of a proposition ..." Or, put in the words of a 19th century author: "Anything is an argument which naturally and legitimately produces an effect upon our minds, and tends to make us think one way rather than another." In order to survive - and hopefully survive well - it will be necessary to listen to and to state arguments: to be able, through pure argument, to convince, or to be able to be convinced, is the usual mark of a successful person, no matter their line of work. In life we must learn life sustaining activities: listening to a good argument and making a good argument are two of these activities. Being in a constant state of argumentation (usually with oneself) is entirely normal and entirely necessary to the living process.

The following are a few argumental terms which have come to mind. I have left out terms which might be described as being philosophic, such as: metaphysics, logic, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Things philosophic are dealt with in <u>blupete's Essay on Philosophy</u>.

-A-

[TOC]

Absurd, Reductio ad Absurdum:-

While originally the argument known as *reductio ad absurdum* was only to be successful if each and every other competing hypothesis involves an absurdity, it has come to mean an argument that brings out the absurdity of a contention made.

[TOC]

Ad Hominem:-

An argument where the appeal is founded on the preferences or principles of a particular person rather than an abstract truth or logical cogency.

[TOC]

A Fortiori:-

This is a Latin expression which literally means with greater force. In logic, it is where, having made or established a large point, a minor point, subsumed in the larger point, is made at the same time; thus, there is no need to argue the validity of the minor point.

[TOC] Analogical Reasoning:-

One of three kinds of reasoning which I identify in these pages. This form of Reasoning is inferior to <u>deductive reasoning</u>.

[TOC]

A Posteriori:-

This is a another Latin expression; its literal meaning, "from that which comes after." In argument (this is the same for <u>scientific method</u>), it means proving things from observations, from experiences, from the evidence; arguing from the effect or effects to prove the cause.

[TOC]

A Priori:-

More fancy Latin words, literally meaning, "from that which comes before." In argument it is where a person, in an effort to prove a further point assumes the validity of some other point. This other point, it is asked, should be accepted as one that may yet be proven, or which the propounder advances as axiomatic. In other words, one is asked to accept something as knowledge without the benefit of any prior experience (empirical evidence), this knowledge, it is said, comes about *a priori*. This approach is often the only way to begin any argument, but should not be resorted to during the course of argument; further, one should always bear in mind, that the resolution to any argument, must, of necessity, be dependent on the "beginning assumptions." While there are some things in this world that simply must be accepted without proof as being axiomatic, an assumption or assumptions always weaken one's argument and should be eschewed as a bad practice.

[TOC]

Argue the Other Side:-

It is natural to seek out and attack the weak points in an opponent's case, but this approach only leads your opponent to abandon or strengthen these parts of his case; it is always best, in an on going argument, to seek out and attack an opponent's case at its strongest. "He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper." (Edmund Burke.) It is best to put your opponent's case into the best argued form that you can, then attack; the approach can be devastating.

[TOC]

Assertation: He Who Asserts Must Prove:-

Hardly can any body start in a neutral position. One cannot argue from a fence top, one must be on one side of it or another; and there is only one side on which one must begin.

Any proposition must either be true or false, it cannot be both; this is known as the law of contradiction. One cannot prove a negative, thus, as the legal maxim will have it, *semper praesumitur pro negante*, the presumption is always in the negative. In the absence of the acceptance of a proposition being true, the propounder, the person who

advances the proposition as being true, has the obligation to proving it to be true. The position from which one must always start is that the proposition (the theory or the hypothesis) is, to start with, false and must be proven to be true.

[TOC]

Axiom:-

"A proposition that commends itself to general acceptance; a well-established or universally-conceded principle; a maxim, rule, law." (OEDII.)

-B-

[TOC]

Begging the Question:-

This is where one assumes the proposition so that he might prove the proposition; Begging the Question consists in making use of the very proposition in dispute, as though it were already proved.

[TOC]

Brevity:-

"Since brevity is the soul of wit, And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes --I will be brief." Shaks.: Hamlet.

"In general those who have nothing to say contrive to spend the longest time in doing it." (James Russell Lowell.)

-C-

[TOC]

Calm, be Calm:-

"Be calm in arguing: for fierceness makes Error a fault, and truth discourtesy." (Geo. Herbert [1593-1633].) "Use soft words and hard arguments." (Henry George Bohn [1796-1884].) "A soft answer relieves anger." (Proverb.)

[TOC]

Cause & Effect:-

"Given certain factors," as the autocrat said, "a sound brain should always evolve the same fixed product with the certainty of a calculating machine." <u>Oliver Wendall</u> <u>Holmes</u> (1809-94) was stating a law of nature, viz., that the same motives always produce the same actions; the same events follow from the same causes. It is this law that comes to assist us when we are required to predict future events, including the most difficult task of predicting the behavior of people. <u>David Hume</u> (1711-76), in dealing with the philosophical question of whether man has freewill showed that every uniquely different "effect" has an equally different "cause."

"It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the

actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: the same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have ever been observed among mankind." (Human Understanding, "Liberty and Necessity.")

"Cause and effect" as <u>Ralph Waldo Emerson</u> (1803-82) said, "are two sides of one fact .. [like the] seed and fruit they can never be severed." Further, "the effect already blooms in the cause, the end pre-exists in the means, the fruit in the seed." So it follows that it is next to useless to deal with just the effect; at best one will get the briefest of relief. "The cause being taken away, the effect is removed." (Latin proverb.)

[TOC]

Complaint (No Complaint Then No Need To Act):-

"The argument amounts to this:- Nobody complains, therefore nobody suffers. It amounts to a veto on all measures of precaution or prevention, and goes to establish a maxim in legislation directly opposed to the most ordinary prudence of common life; it enjoins us to build no parapets to a bridge till the number of accidents has raised a universal clamor ." (Sydney Smith, "Fallacies of Anti-reformers.")

[TOC]

Concept (See "<u>On Philosophy</u>"):-

[TOC]

Conclusion:-

Consisting of an <u>inference</u>, or inferences which are reached through the <u>reasoning</u> <u>process</u>. "A judgement or statement arrived at by any reasoning process; an inference, deduction, induction." Or, expressed in logic: "A proposition deduced by reasoning from previous propositions: spec. the last of the three propositions forming a syllogism, deduced from the two former or <u>premisses</u>."(OEDII.)

[TOC]

Contradiction (The Law of):-

A proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time.

-D-

[TOC]

Deductive Reasoning:-

Deductive reasoning is a method by which one might prove a <u>theory</u>, - the process of deriving consequences from admitted or established <u>premisses</u>; to take away from the whole, to deduct for a sum; to test the theory on each deductive sum; and to continue to test each new deductive sum until the test fails, at which time an adjustment is made

to the theory, and, once again, to expose the new theory to the deductive reasoning process. As <u>Sir Karl Popper</u> has showed us, only the deductive reasoning process (as opposed to <u>inductive</u> and <u>analogical</u>) guarantees the correctness of the conclusion. "To conclude that all apples are red because 1000 apples are found to be red is inductive reasoning, therefore not reliable. Similarly, the argument that John should be able to graduate from college because his identical twin who inherited the same faculties did so, is reasoning by analogy, and the results from this process are not reliable. Deductive reasoning, on the other hand, although it can take many forms, does guarantee the conclusion. Thus, if one grants that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, one must accept that Socrates is mortal. The principle of logic involved here is one form of what Aristotle called syllogistic reasoning. Among other laws of deductive reasoning <u>Aristotle</u> included the law of contradiction (a proposition cannot be both true and false) and the law of excluded middle (a proposition must be either true or false)."2

[TOC]

Dialectic Method:-

"The dialectic," is a branch of logic in the art of reasoning and\or disputing. It is a classic approach, one at which Socrates was a master. Through the use of it, Socrates (and, in my experience, many a good cross-examining lawyer) would lead his adversary to make clear his position on the subject, then, often with the introduction of an absolutely contrary theory, discussion would ensue, which may lead to an admission, on the other side, that there does exist, maybe only in a minor particular, that one of their beliefs, formerly held, is inaccurate. The German philosophers of the idealist school were partial to the dialectic method. It was employed, as often it was, beginning with Plato, to set one theory in opposition with another, and thus to develop a subject in a comprehensive manner. First an idea (a Thesis) was thrown up against another theory (an Antithesis); from this, it was thought, an advance might be made to a third stage, a stage which would bring the disputants closer to the truth. Often, though not necessarily, - the third stage would come from a combination of both the ideas: a synthesis would occur. What is suppose to come from this process is the truth of a proposition; this is not to be confused with a negotiation process whereby, usually, compromises are wrought out. It must be remembered that while the truth may lie between one proposition or another, it may (I suggest more likely that not) lie fully with one thesis or the other (either the Thesis or the Antithesis). It is my impression that the German idealist school, - for that matter, most any school of thought - through the dialectic always came away with a synthesis, "a combo" of the two ideas under review (the Thesis and the Antithesis). Thus, much of what we believe is a "remix" of ideas previously held or held by others; ideas get mixed over and over again in, it would seem, in an ever-ending process. The overall result is a hopeless maze of probabilities, which some souls would assert is exactly what reality is all about.

[TOC] Dogma:-

Dogma is an opinion received from another in a position of authority and is accepted

as a settled truth; it is not based on experience or on demonstration.

"[Dogma] is essentially an artificial doctrine, a learned doctrine [viz., not to be gained from experience or demonstration]. It is an inference from facts which the mass of mankind could never have found out for themselves; facts which, without a distinctly learned teaching, could never be brought home to them in any intelligible shape. Now what is the value of such a doctrine? Does it follow that, because it is confessedly artificial, because it springs, not from a spontaneous impulse, but from a learned teaching, it is therefore necessarily foolish, mischievous, perhaps unnatural? It may perhaps be safer to hold that, like many other doctrines, many other sentiments, it is neither universally good nor universally bad, neither inherently wise nor inherently foolish. It may be safer to hold that it may, like other doctrines and sentiments, have a range within which it may work for good, while in some other range it may work for evil. It may in short be a doctrine which is neither to be rashly accepted, nor rashly cast aside, but one which may need to be guided, regulated, modified, according to time, place, and circumstance. I am not now called on so much to estimate the practical good and evil of the doctrine as to work out what the doctrine itself is, and to try to explain some difficulties about it, but I must emphatically say that nothing can be more shallow, nothing more foolish, nothing more purely sentimental, than the talk of those who think that they can simply laugh down or shriek down any doctrine or sentiment which they themselves do not understand. A belief or a feeling which has a practical effect on the conduct of great masses of men, sometimes on the conduct of whole nations, may be very false and very mischievous; but it is in every case a great and serious fact, to be looked gravely in the face. Men who sit at their ease and think that all wisdom is confined to themselves and their own clique may think themselves vastly superior to the great emotions which stir our times, as they would doubtless have thought themselves vastly superior to the emotions which stirred the first Saracens or the first Crusaders. But the emotions are there all the same, and they do their work all the same. The most highly educated man in the most highly educated society cannot sneer them out of being. (Edward A. Freeman (1823-92), "Race and Language.")

-E-[TOC] Excluded Middle (The Law of):-

A proposition must be either true or false.

-**F**-

[TOC]

Facts:-

A fact is "something that has really occurred or is actually the case; something certainly known to be of this character; hence, a particular truth known by actual observation or authentic testimony, as opposed to what is merely inferred, or to a conjecture or fiction; a datum of experience, as distinguished from the conclusions that may be based upon it." (OEDII.) While "facts are stubborn things" you must have some of them before commencing your argument: "Facts are more powerful than arguments." Facts have been likened to the beads; and the theory, a string on which they are to be hung. <u>Theory</u> is fine, and, entirely necessary; but one must insist on getting at the facts. One must raise their arguments on a foundation of facts: and, insist, that others do likewise.

"It is as fatal as it is cowardly to blink facts because they are not to our taste. ... The brightest flashes in the world of thought are incomplete until they have been proven to have their counterparts in the world of fact." (John Tyndall, Fragments of Science.)

And we give the last word on this subject of facts, of course, to **Oliver Wendall Holmes**:

"All generous minds have a horror of what are commonly called 'facts.' They are the brute beasts of the intellectual domain. Who does not know fellows that always have an ill-conditioned fact or two which they lead after them into decent company like so many bulldogs, ready to let slip at every ingenious suggestion, or convenient generalization, or pleasant fancy? ... Facts always yield the place of honor, in conversation, to thoughts about facts; but if a false note is uttered, down comes the finger on the key and the man of facts asserts his true dignity."

[TOC]

False Consolation:-

I have found in my experience at the bar that my opponent was always interested in getting the jurors or the trial judge to look into other corners. They often do not argue their case; they may argue, for example, that the Defendant can afford to pay, or the plaintiff doesn't deserve the award on the basis that there are people worse off. The argument of false consolation was one that your mother used when she wanted you to eat your spinach, "Just think of all the starving children in China." Whether I should eat spinach, or not, has absolutely nothing to do with the children in China. (I remember thinking - never expressed - that if the person proffering the spinach could figure a way to get the spinach, then in front of me, off and over to China: I would support the effort.) "Why should the smallest evil be endured which can be cured because others suffer patiently under greater evils? Should the smallest improvement attainable be neglected because others remain contented in a state of still greater inferiority." (Sydney Smith, "Fallacies of Anti-reformers.")

-G-

[TOC]

General Terms (Get The Specifics):-

It is a legal maxim that, "A deceiver deals in general terms." Therefore give specific and concrete examples in your presentation, and, be critical of anyone who does not do likewise.

-H-

[TOC] Hypothesis:-

A hypothesis is that mental shape or concept which one holds of a larger situation; constructed from, and which fits, all known facts (see <u>scientific method</u>). However, a hypothesis is always but a <u>Theory</u> to be refined. A hypothesis may have a good number fellow hypotheses on which it relies. A hypothesis may not be a true representation of the events or things to be perceived; but any self-respecting hypothesist would only put forth a hypothesis which is consistent with all known facts. "One of the conditions of a good hypothesis is, that it fairly comport with all other phænomena of nature, as well as those 'tis framed to explicate." (Robert Boyle, 1627-1691.)

-I-

[TOC]

Inductive Reasoning:-

Inductive reasoning is based upon, or characterized by the use of induction, or reasoning from particular facts to general principles. It is a method by which reasoning is grounded. Though there is a great mass of people -- yet, and to continue yet -- whose observations are cursory and narrow; they nonetheless might be described as philosophers, inductive philosophers without knowing it. Their resulting inferences are equally narrow; and, sadly, too, -- often crude, prejudiced, and just plain wrong. Inductive reasoning is one of three kinds of reasoning which I identify in these pages (the other two: analogical and deductive). While inductive reasoning, as a method of reasoning, is considered inferior to deductive reasoning, it is, in the final analysis, maybe, the only method open to us: defective as inductive reasoning maybe. However, inductive reasoning, as a method, often proves to be attractive, for it gets one away from a priori thinking with its high-flown language and its imprecise ideas. "In Inductive reasoning, the parts are first stated, and what is predicated of them is also predicated of the whole they constitute." (Bowen, 1864.) In the final analysis, however, as Herschel, the younger, pointed out, in 1830: "The whole of natural philosophy consists entirely of a series of inductive generalizations."

"... facts to principles is called induction, which in its highest form is inspiration; but, to be sure, the inward sight must be shown to be in accordance with outward fact. To prove or disprove the induction, we must resort to deduction and experiment. ... The inductive principle is founded in man's desire to know ... Before these methods were adopted the unbridled imagination roamed through Nature, putting in the place of law the figments of superstitious dread. For thousands of years witchcraft, and magic, and miracles, and special providences ... had the world to themselves." (John Tyndall (1820-93), Fragments.)

In conclusion, I should say, the inductive process is automatic and natural to a normally healthy human being; it is inherent and comes with our basic issue and goes along with the known seven senses; it is a natural law instilled within us which maybe known as the law of conditioned reflexes or the law of association. (See, too, <u>scientific</u> method.)

[TOC] Inference:-

If ones needs to be convinced that the meaning of this word is much disputed in the academic world, they need only consult the OED. The word, inference has become a finely dissected word. Indeed, some logicians claim that the making of an inference is not something that can be done in certain of the reasoning processes. For example, strictly speaking, one cannot draw an inference from the <u>deductive process</u>; the best that one might expect to receive - through the <u>syllogistic process</u> - is a newly stated hypothesis, which, of course, being but an <u>hypothesis</u>, requires further working. At any rate, an inference, whatever it maybe, comes about in <u>Logic</u>, and is "the forming of a conclusion from data or premisses, either by inductive or deductive methods ..."

-L-

[TOC]

Logic:-

Logic I have dealt with in <u>blupete's Essay on Philosophy</u>

-M-

[TOC]

Mathematics:-

Mathematics is pure logic, applied. It is the "the abstract science which investigates deductively the conclusions implicit in the elementary conceptions of spatial and numerical relations, and which includes as its main divisions geometry, arithmetic, and algebra." The OEDII continues: mathematics, in a wider sense, includes "those branches of physical or other research which consist in the application of this abstract science to concrete data. When the word is used in its wider sense, the abstract science is distinguished as pure mathematics, and its concrete applications (e.g. in astronomy, various branches of physics, the theory of probabilities) as applied or mixed mathematics."

-N-

[TOC]

Non Sequitur:-

An inference or a conclusion which does not follow from the premisses.

-0-

[TOC]

Occam's Razor:-

Occam's razor is a principle which was first pronounced by William of Occam (1300-49). The principle runs as follows: for purposes of explanation, things not known to exist should not be postulated as existing; entities or supposed existences ought not

to be multiplied beyond the point of the simplest possible explanation, not beyond what is absolutely necessary. A person who prefers "<u>materialism</u>' will use occam's razor to full advantage, a materialist being one who prefers natural explanations, where they are at all plausible.

[TOC]

Obvious, Do not Argue Against the Obvious:-

"One does not argue against the sun." (Latin Proverb.)

-P-

[TOC] Post Hoc:-

The fallacy of thinking that a thing which follows another is therefore caused by it.

[TOC]

Premisses:-

That which we start with. A previous statement or proposition from which another is <u>inferred</u> or follows as a <u>conclusion</u>. Usually there are two propositions from which the conclusion is derived in a <u>syllogism</u>. They may be compared with the footings of a structure; and, any structure can be no more solid then its footings. To be effective, one must always test and re-test the premisses as being true, if they are off the mark, even by a little (see, <u>The Law of Contradiction</u>) then the <u>conclusions</u> cannot be trusted.

[TOC]

Principles, Statement of First Principles:-

There is an old legal maxim, "there is no arguing with anyone who denies first principles." Therefore, the first task is to see if there can be a statement of principles upon which the opponents can agree.

[TOC]

Procrastinator's Argument:-

"Wait a little, this is not the time. This is the common argument of men who, being in reality hostile to a measure, are ashamed or afraid of appearing to be so." (<u>Sydney</u> Smith, "Fallacies of Anti-reformers.")

[TOC]

Proof:-

The evidence may range through every degree, from the barest likelihood to an undoubted moral certainty. In a court of law the degree of proof will vary depending on the seriousness of the matter, viz., to prove a person to be a criminal requires a fairly high degree of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) versus a civil claim such as a claim that your neighbour owes you money (balance of probabilities). It is well to understand under this head, proof, to remind you of the burden under which the propounder of the proposition labors: **he who asserts must prove**. Thus, it is well established, in regular argument, and certainly in any court of law, that an aggrieved party must lead evidence to prove the assertions or allegations against another.

-**R**-

[TOC]

Reasoning Process:-

There are three methods of reasoning: inductive, analogical, and deductive.

[TOC]

Refute, to Refute or Make Paradoxical Statements:-

It was Aristotle[Sophistical Refutations, Bk. 1, Ch. 12, para. 5] who first showed that the winning of the argument will come about once you have obtained paradoxical statements from your opponent. The object is to get your opponent committed to two statements, which when compared are paradoxical. Let us demonstrate by quoting Aristotle:

"In their view the standard of nature was the truth, while that of the law was the opinion held by the majority. So that it is clear that they, too, used to try either to refute the answerer or to make him make paradoxical statements, [thus, you have reduced your opponent where he has to take one position or the other] just as the men of to-day do as well. Some questions are such that in both forms the answer is paradoxical; e.g. 'Ought one to obey the wise or one's father?' and 'Ought one to do what is expedient or what is just?' and 'Is it preferable to suffer injustice or to do an injury?' You should lead people, then, into [one or the other of two] views [to which is restricted, either the one] opposite to the majority ... [or the other opposite] to the philosophers; if any one speaks as do the expert reasoners, lead him into opposition to the majority, while if he speaks as do the majority, then into opposition to the reasoners. For some say that of necessity the happy man is just, whereas it is paradoxical to the many that a king should be happy. To lead a man into paradoxes of this sort is the same as to lead him into the opposition of the standards of nature and law: for the law represents the opinion of the majority, whereas philosophers speak according to the standard of nature and the truth. Paradoxes, then, you should seek to elicit by means of these common-place rules. Now as for making any one [to make your opponent] babble, ... This is the object in view in all arguments ..."

[TOC] Relevancies:-

To introduce irrelevancies into your argument, in addition to consuming valuable time, is to give the impression that your position is weak. One is obliged to keep in mind the point, or the objective; and everything said or written must be consistent with it, and to advance it.



On Argument.

[TOC] Scientific Method:-

The scientific method is the <u>inductive reasoning process</u> strictly applied. The scientific method demands that all assumptions be questioned, it is <u>skeptical</u> to a degree, and starts with the fundamental assumption that material <u>effect</u> is impossible without material <u>cause</u>. Scientific theories, and this is just as so for philosophic statements, can only be put as <u>hypotheses</u>, propositions, which can never be known as certain, but which can be deliberately put to the test of observation and experiment, and revised or rejected if their predictions get falsified. To accept these statements one has to be familiar with the empiricist school and the works of <u>Locke</u> and <u>Hume</u>. We are to thank the empiricist school for the development of natural physical laws, such as <u>Newtonian laws</u>. That we should proceed by our senses, as we have in scientific theory, and accept only that which is consistent and coherent with past experiences, is equally applicable to philosophic thought; this proposition has been fully developed by <u>Sir Karl Popper</u>; see in particular, The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) (Princeton University Press, 1971).

[TOC]

Skeptical:-

See treatment in blupete's Essay on Philosophy.

[TOC]

Socratic Method:-

A method named after the classic Greek philosopher, <u>Socrates</u>. Incidentally, Socrates left no books; what we know of him comes to us through the writings of <u>Plato</u>. Personally, the mentioning of Socrates brings to mind the "Socratic method"; a method employed, to my great frustration, I recall, by a number of my law school professors; a method which hardly brought about many answers, just more and more questions. "Feigning total ignorance before the opinionated, he would with celebrated Socratic irony pose a simple question such as 'What is courage?' From the replies given he would construct contradictory consequences and so start again. His aim was to act as a midwife to those in labour for knowledge."

[TOC]

Syllogism:-

A syllogism is an argument expressed in the form of two propositions, called the <u>premisses</u>; which, are carefully chosen and placed in respect to one another, such, that the reasoner can infer a further and different proposition, a third proposition called the <u>conclusion</u>.

[TOC] Synthesis:-

See Dialectic Method.

-T-

[TOC]

Matters of Taste:-

Before setting out to argue with anyone, make a determination, right at the first, as to whether your opposite number holds his or her views because of a matter of taste, or as a matter of fact. One cannot be cornered into arguing matters of taste. As <u>Macaulay</u> has observed, when their morality is not a science, but a taste, when they abandon eternal principles for accidental associations - then it is not likely that rational argument will change the situation and you might well consider conserving your energy.

[TOC]

Terms (Defining or Coming to Terms):-

The chief reason people remain in controversy and draw different conclusions even though, in reality, they face the same set of external facts is that there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy.

"... Men affix different ideas to their terms [and so it is easy to see they] form different opinions of the same subject... It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other." (Hume, Human Understanding, "Of Liberty and Necessity.)

[TOC]

Thesis:-

See treatment under the **Dialectic Method**.

[TOC]

Theory:-

"Right or wrong, a thoughtfully-uttered theory has a dynamic power which operates against intellectual stagnation; and even by provoking opposition is eventually of service to the cause of truth." (John Tyndall (1820-93), Fragments.)

As <u>Sir Karl Popper</u> put it, "All theories are trials; they are tentative hypotheses, tried out to see whether they work."[The Poverty of Historicism (1957) (Routledge, 1969).] For a theory to be valid, even a first approximation, it must be compatible with all known observations. If a theory does not work in practice, it is likely because there is something wrong with the theory and it is in need of revision.

"Of nearly every theory it may be said that it agrees with many facts: this is one

of the reasons why a theory can be said to be corroborated only if we are unable to find refuting facts, rather than if we are able to find supporting facts." (Bryan Magee's Popper.)

"A theory must first of all provide a solution to a problem that interests us. But it must also be compatible with all known observations, and contain its predecessor theories as first approximations - though it must also contradict them at the points where they failed, and account for their failure." (Magee, *Ibid.*)

[TOC]

Truth:-

See blupete's Essay On Truth.

[TOC] Tu Quoque:-

An argument which consists in retorting a charge upon one's accuser. It is a rejoinder best reflected in the expression, "Physician heal thyself." Incidently, saying nothing to the charge, being Mum, is the "Italian *tu quoque*."

[TOC]

Quotes RE Argument:-

"Who, too deep for his hearers, still went on refining, And thought of convincing while they thought of dining." Goldsmith: Retaliation.

"Since brevity is the soul of wit, And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes --I will be brief." (Shaks.: Hamlet.)

"Blessed is the man who, having nothing to say, abstains from giving us wordy evidence of the fact." (George Eliot.)

"In general those who have nothing to say contrive to spend the longest time in doing it." (J. R. Lowell.)

"I am no orator ... [I] am a blunt man." (Shaks., Julius Cæsar.)

"One has to vulgarize his messages so as to get them safely into the brain of the audience." (Arnold Bennett.)

Quod dubitas, ne feceris - Where you doubt, do nothing. (A legal maxim.)

Qui prior est tempore potior est jure - He who is first in time has the strongest claim in law. (A legal maxim.)

Qui non improbat, approbat - He who does not disapprove, approves. (A legal maxim.)

"The true way to be deceived is to think oneself more clever than others." (Rochefoucauld, Maxim 127.)

"When two parties with fixed ideas, different from one another, begin to quarrel, the dispute will never come to an end, except through the weariness of the combatants. ... Instead of reasoning upon a deceptive word, let us consider effects." (<u>Bentham</u>, p. 79-80.)

"The hydrostatic paradox of controversy -- Controversy equalizes fools and wise men in the same way, - and the fools know it." (Oliver Wendall Holmes.)

[TOC] NOTES:

¹ Peter Landry is a lawyer and has been, for 20 years, in private practice in the City of Dartmouth. He invites correspondence on the topic and may be contacted at P.O. Box 1200, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, B2Y 4B8, or at peteblu@blupete.com.

² See <u>Kline</u>.

[Essays, First Series] [Essays, Second Series] [Essays, Third Series] [Essays, Fourth Series] [Subject Index] [Home] [Top] January, 1998.

Peter Landry peteblu@blupete.com P.O. Box 1200, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. CANADA. B2Y 4B8 About Blupete Biographies Essays of Blupete History Law Letters to Blupete Search What's New Wildflowers of Nova Scotia



Subject Index Of The Essays & Commentaries of blupete.

Legend:

- \mathbf{O} = **An Essay**
- = A Subheading within an Essay
- O = A Commentary

HVP = A High Volume Page; Thousands Of Visits Now Registered.

A	B	<u><u></u><u>D</u></u>	E	F	G	H	Ī	J	K	L	Li	
M	<u>N</u>	<u>P</u>	Po	<u>R</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>So</u>	T	U	V	W	Y	Z

[TOC]

-A-

- <u>A Fortiori</u>
- o <u>A Posteriori</u>
- o <u>A Priori</u>
- <u>Ability</u>
- <u>Abortion</u>
- <u>Acadians</u>
- Action
- O <u>Ad Hominem</u>
- Advice, On Giving
- <u>Age</u>
- Age of Reason

"On Art."

- <u>Anarchy</u>
- o Animals
- Apprenticeship

• Argument

o <u>Art</u>

- Attention; Or, How To Get It.
- Austrian School of Economics
- <u>Authority</u>

[TOC]

-**B**-

- Bacon's Rules
- Baffle Gab
- Banks, The Birth of ..
- Begging The Question
- <u>Belief</u>

o **Books**

- British North America Act, 1867
- Bureaucracy
- Business, Men of ... (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Economics.")

[TOC]

-C-

- Cant & Hypocrisy
- <u>Capital</u> (Economics)
- <u>Capitalism</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Economics.")
- Capital Punishment
- Cause & Effect
- <u>Character</u>
- <u>Change</u>
- <u>Charity</u>
- Charity, Greed and Morals
- <u>Charter</u>

- Children, In Marriage and In Divorce
- Civilization
- <u>Civilization</u>
- Common Law v. Legislation
- Compassion
- <u>Competition</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- <u>Competition</u> (Commentary of February 21st, 1999.)
- <u>Competition, Monopoly and ...</u>
- Competitive Nature of Man

o **Constitutions**

Constitution, History of

- Constitution of Canada
- Constitution of United States
- O Constitution Act, 1982
- <u>Contract</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Creed (Mencken's)

o Crime and Punishment

- O Criminal Law
- o <u>Culture</u>

[TOC]

-D-

- o Death, Life & ...
- Debt (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- O Deductive Reasoning
- Deficit (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Demagoguery
- <u>Demand</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Demeanour

• **Democracy**

- o Democracy, Grecian
- Dialectic Method

o **Divorce**

o <u>Dogma</u>

o **Drugs**

- Drugs, The War on ...
- <u>Dualism</u>
- <u>Duty</u>

[TOC]

-E-

• Economics

- Economic Growth
- Economic Man
- Economics, Mathematical School of ...

o <u>Economic Terms</u>

- Economics, The Study of ...
- <u>Economy, Ancient Egyptian</u>
- Economy, Ancient Greek
- Economy, Ancient Peruvian

o **Education**

- Education: The Counsels of Don Quixote
- Education: Unschoolers
- Education, The State as Parent
- Education, A Private ...

o Education, Voucher System

- Elasticity (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- o <u>e-mail</u>
- Empiricism

- Enlightenment
- Epicureanism
- Equality (Freedom v. ...)
- Ethics
- Ethics & Economics
- Evil & Good
- Evolution
- Evolution of Man
- Experience
- Externalities (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")

[TOC]

-**F**-

- Faith & Hope
- Fame, Fear & Feelings
- Family
- Family System and the Extended Order (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Economics.")
- <u>Fees</u>
- Feminism & Family
- Fetal Rights
- Feudal System
- Flowers
- Flowers (Wild)
- Fortitude --Prudence, Temperance and ...

o Freedom

- Freedom v. Equality
- Free Speech
- Free Trade
- Free Will

• French Revolution (1789, 1830 & 1848) (In connection with bio. on Bastiat.)

- [TOC]
- -G-

- Gambling
- o Genius
- O Glorious Revolution

o <u>God</u>

• <u>Good & Evil</u>

o **Government**

- Government, Benevolent
- Government, Estates of ...
- Government, "Presidential" & "Cabinet" Forms of ...
- Government Power
- Government Power, Montesquieu's Separation Theory
- Government Regulations
- Government, Representative
- Government Spending
- o <u>Grammar</u>
- O Greed, Morals and Charity
- <u>Guild System</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")

[TOC]

-H-

• Happiness

o <u>Hayek</u>

- Hazlitt's One Thing To Make Him Happy
- <u>Hero, The</u>

о History [нVр]

- History, Lessons of ...
- History, Theories of ...
- <u>History</u>
- Hobbesian Theory
- Homepage, On Making A Default ..
- Hope & Faith

- <u>Humanist</u>
- Husbandry
- Hypocrisy, Cant & ...

[TOC]

-I-

Inductive Reasoning

Industrial Revolution

o Inflation

- Inflation (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Information Age (Dewey & Babbage)
- o <u>Inheritance</u>
- Inns of Courts
- Interest (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Interest Groups (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Politics and The Lie of Legitimacy.")

[TOC]

-J-

- Jargon
- Journalists

o Judges

- Justice
- Justice -- "Love, Respect and"

[TOC]

-K-

• Knowledge, Facts & Principles

[TOC]

-L-

- Labour Theory of Value
- Land (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")

o **Language**

- Laissez-faire
- o <u>Law</u>
- Law, Bullum v. Boatum

o Law, Common

o Law, Contracts

o Law, Criminal

- <u>Law, Natural</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Law.")
- Law, Natural (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Government.")
- Law, Positive
- Law, "The Presumption Of Innocence (I)."
- Law, "The Presumption Of Innocence (II)."
- Law, The Proper Notion Of ...
- Law, The Rule of ... (Commentary of September 27th, 1998.)
- Law, The Rule of ... (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Government.")
- Law, The Rule of ... (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Law.")
- Law, The Rule of (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Legislation.")
- Law, The Rule of ... (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On A Country's Constitution.")
- o Law, The Three Great Principles

o Lawyers

- Lawyers, History and Literature
- Leadership

o Legislation

- Legislation, Common Law v. ...
- <u>Leisure.</u>
- <u>Liberalism</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "The Siren's Song.")
- Liberalism (Commentary of March 22nd, 1998.)
- <u>Liberalism, Despotic</u> (Commentary of July 27th, 1998.)

- o **Liberty**
- <u>Library</u>
- (Library) Information Age: Dewey & The Computer
- Life & Death.
- Life Style
- Literature, A Sea Of ..., Must It Be A Measureless and Pathless Chaos?
- Lockian Theory
- o <u>Logic</u>

o Love

- o <u>Love</u>
- Love, Respect and Justice.
- Lying
- Lying President

[TOC]

-**M**-

- Macroeconomics
- "Madness, Divine."

o Man, Nature of

- Manchester School of Economics
- Manners
- Marginal Utility Theory (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Market (Commentary of February 21st, 1999.)
- Market, The (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "The Nature of Man.")
- Market, The (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Economics.")

o Marriage

- <u>Materialism</u>
- <u>Mathematics</u>
- Medical Care, Right To ...
- Medical Services.
- Medical System, The Reason for the Failure Of the Canadian
- Medical System: Another Opening Crack

- Metaphysics
- Mercantilism
- Microeconomics
- Middle Class
- Mob Psychology.
- Money (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Property Rights.")
- Money (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Monopoly (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Monopoly and Competition
- Morals, Greed and Charity
- Moral Codes
- Morals & Legislation
- Moral Sentiment Theory
- Motivation

[TOC]

-N-

• Nationalism & Patriotism

o <u>Nature</u>

- <u>Nature or Nurture</u>
- <u>Non Sequitur</u>

[TOC]

-0-

- Occam's Razor
- Offense, On Giving
- Old Things
- Opinion, On
- Orators (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Politics and The Lie of Legitimacy.")
- Opinion, Public or Popular
- Public Opinion
- Oratory, On

[TOC]

-P-

- Party System (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Politics and The Lie of Legitimacy.")
- Patriotism & Nationalism
- Passion
- Philanthrophy

о Philosophy [hVp]

- Philosophy
- <u>Phrenology</u>
- Physics
- <u>Physiocrats</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- <u>Poetry</u>
- Political Process and Democracy
- o <u>Polity</u>
- Police and A Citizen's Rights, The
- Police and Entrapment, The
- Police and Random Checks, The
- Police and The Search Warrant, The
- Police and Wire Taps, The
- Politicians (Apr'99)
- Politicians (May'01)
- Politicians, The In Crowd
- Politicians, The Natural Proclivities of Enthusiastic ...
- Politicians

Politics & Politicians

- Pollution
- Poor Children in Canada

• Popper

- Popper's Sociological Laws
- Population, On
- Pornography, Politics of ..
- <u>Power</u>

- <u>Power, Positions of ...</u>
- <u>Poverty and Morals</u>
- Prejudice (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On The Nature Of Man.")
- Prejudice, On (Commentary of April 29th, 2001.)
- Press and Democracy
- Press, Freedom (Licentiousness) of ...
- Price (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- **<u>Profit</u>** (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")

o **Property**

- <u>Property</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Prudence, Temperance and Fortitude
- Presumption Of Innocence. [II]

o Punishment, Crime and ...

[TOC]

-R-

- <u>Rationalism</u>
- <u>Reality</u>
- <u>Reason, Age of</u>
- <u>Reformer, The ...</u>
- <u>Regulations</u>

o **Religion**

- <u>Renaissance</u>
- <u>Rent</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- <u>Representative Government</u>
- O <u>Representative</u>, Virtual
- <u>Resolution, On</u>
- Respect -- "Love, ... and Justice."
- <u>Revolutions</u>
- O <u>Rhetoric</u>
- Right & Wrong

o **<u>Rights</u>**

- <u>Rights</u> (Commentary of December 23rd, 2001 -- "Extraordinary Times.")
- ORights, Bill of, 1690

o **Rights, Guns**

<u>Rights, Tobacco & Guns</u>

- Right, To A House & Food.
- Right To Be Left Alone.
- Right, To Medical Care.
- <u>Risk</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- <u>Romanticism</u>
- Rule of Law, see <u>Law</u>
- Rules For Living Together

[TOC]

-**S**-

- Sailing Ships.
- <u>Scepticism</u>
- <u>Scholasticism</u>
- Scientific Method
- Scotland & The Scottish
- <u>Sea, The</u>
- Sea, Christmas By The ...
- Search Warrant
- <u>Self-Interest</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "The Nature of Man.")
- <u>Self-Interest</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Economics.")
- Senate, Canadian
- <u>Sentimentality.</u>
- September 11th.

o <u>Sex</u>

- <u>Slavery</u>
- <u>Slave State</u>
- Social Contract

o Socialism

- <u>Socialism.</u>
- Socialism -- Who's To Get What
- Socialism, Leacock's Views
- Socialism, Macaulay's Views
- Socratic Method
- Soldier, The Rise of the Professional ...
- Solitude, On
- <u>Sophist</u>
- Speaking
- Sports (Feb'99)
- Sports (Feb'00)
- Stare Decisis (Common Law)
- Stare Decisis (Judges & Justice)
- <u>Statistics</u>
- <u>Stoicism</u>
- Story Telling, The Art of ..
- <u>Success</u>
- <u>Suicide</u>
- <u>Sunrise</u>
- <u>Surplus Value</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- <u>Syllogism</u>

[TOC]

-**T**-

- <u>Tact</u>
- <u>Talent</u>
- <u>Taste</u> (Commentary of December 13th, 1998.)
- <u>Taste</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On Argument.")

o <u>Taxes</u>

- <u>Taxes</u> (Commentary of January 25th, 1998.)
- <u>Taxes</u> (Commentary of December 23rd, 2001 -- "Extraordinary Times.")

- <u>Taxes, International Competition & The Electronic Age</u>
- Tax Surplus
- <u>Teaching</u>
- <u>Temperance --Prudence, ... and Fortitude</u>
- <u>Temptation</u>
- <u>Terror</u>
- Terror Legislation

о Thoreau [нVр]

<u>o</u> <u>Time</u>

o **Tobacco**

- o <u>Totalitarianism</u>
- <u>Tradition</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On The Common Law.")
- <u>Tradition</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "On the Nature of Man.")
- o <u>Trial, The</u>

o <u>Truth</u>

- <u>Truth</u>
- o <u>"Tyranny."</u>

[TOC]

-U-

o <u>Unions</u>

- 0 <u>Utilitarianism</u>
- o <u>Utopia</u>

[TOC]

-V-

- Value, Labour Theory of ... (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- Vanity
- Voting (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Politics and The Lie of Legitimacy.")

[TOC]

-W-

o Walden

- o <u>War</u>
- Way Of The World
- <u>Wealth</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Economic Terms.")
- <u>Wealth</u> (Commentary of October 1st, 2000.)
- <u>Wealth</u> (As a subheading in blupete's essay, "Government.")
- Weasel Words
- <u>Wildflowers</u> (May'98)
- <u>Wildflowers</u> (May'01)
- Will, The Common
- Will, The Unconquerable ...
- Wire Taps (Police)
- Womenhood

o Writing

• Writing, Judicial

[TOC]

-Y-

• Yeast

[TOC]

-Z-

• The Zeitgeist

[Top]

[Essays, First Series] [Essays, Second Series] [Essays, Third Series] [Essays, Fourth Series] [Commentaries, Archives] [Home]

January, 2002.

Peter Landry peteblu@blupete.com

P.O. Box 1200, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. CANADA. B2Y 4B8 Search

Genealogy

History

Law

Library

- » <u>Economics</u>
- » <u>Fiction</u>
- » <u>History</u> » Low
- » <u>N.S. Books</u>
- » <u>Philosophy</u>
- » <u>Political</u>

Links

Biographies

- » <u>Economists</u>
- » <u>Essayist</u>
 » Fiction
- » Law
- » <u>Law</u> » Philosophy
- » Poets
- » Politica
- » <u>Scientists</u>

Nature

Home

Commentary

» Archives.

Blupete's Commentary

February 15th, 1998.

"Capital Punishment"

"Laws gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe seldom executed." $\frac{1}{2}$

Personally, as for convicted criminals, I take no objection to imprisonment; or, for that matter, corporal punishment, including putting the criminal, in certain circumstances, to death. What I do take serious objection to, is being a victim to criminals. Aside from taking all the personal steps I can, to lesson my risk of being a victim of a criminal -- I would like to live in a community which takes a full set of steps to discourage criminal activity. Punishment is one of these steps.

The plain fact of the matter is that people are driven to do, or not to do things by the twin engines of **hope** and **fear**. Punishment, I believe, is one of the pillars of justice; it is to be meted out mercifully but always to be measured to suit the crime. "The only true way to make the mass of mankind see the beauty of justice is by showing to them in pretty plain terms the consequences of injustice."² With law comes the notion, according to Locke, of either reward or punishment.³ It should also be remembered that the primary reason for the law's existence is that it should be such that people need not feel the need to strike out against those who do wrong against them. It is entirely natural for individuals, when wronged by another or others, to seek revenge and retribution and that it is potentially harmful to the state, if the state, does not satisfy these urges; not much good will come of it when people take the law into their own hands; but they will do so, quick enough, if they see that the law does not give them, as the victoms, any satisfaction.

As for **capital punishment**: I take the moral high ground: life is precious. However, that life is precious, is no reason to object to capital punishment, -- indeed, this is the primary justification for capital punishment. A legitimate use of punishment is its use as a deterrent; so too, it is a legitimate use to satisfy the need which the victim and his family have for retribution (*lex talionis*<u>4</u>). Thus, in this question of capital punishment, both deterrence and retribution play a role; but, there is an additional reason: to permanently rid ourselves of murderers.

[<u>UP</u>]

NOTES:

¹Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanac, 1738.

² Sydney Smith.

³ "We must, wherever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed to that Rule." (Locke's Human Understanding.) It is thought, and it seems reasonable enough, that in "general, the method of punishment is more satisfactory than the method of reward, because it can be controlled to a greater extent." (R. M. Yerkes, as quoted by OED2.)

 $\frac{4}{2}$ Lex talionis are fancy Latin words meaning the law of equivalent retaliation. The Mosaic Code of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" lurks behind legal punishment.

[Top] [Archives] [To Blupete's Essays] [Home] Blupete's Weekly Commentary.

peteblu@blupete.com February, 1998

Logical Fallacies

by James W. Benham and Thomas J. Marlowe

The first author came up with the original idea, based on William Safire's collection of grammatical rules in a similar format. The second author contributed most of the examples. Responsibility for choosing the best ones rests exclusively with the first author.

- Ad hominem arguments are the tools of scoundrels and blackguards. Therefore, they are invalid.
- If you had any consideration for my feelings, you wouldn't argue from an appeal to pity.
- What would your mother say if you argued from an appeal to sentiment?
- I don't understand how anyone could argue from an appeal to incredulity.
- If you argue from an appeal to force, I'll have to beat you up.
- You are far too intelligent to accept an argument based on an appeal to vanity.
- Everyone knows that an argument from appeal to popular opinion is invalid.
- Circular reasoning means assuming what you're trying to prove. This form of argument is invalid becuase it's circular.
- As Aristotle said, arguments from an appeal to authority are invalid.
- *Post hoc ergo proptor hoc* arguments often precede false conclusions. Hence, this type of argument is invalid.
- Using the *Argumentum ad Consequentiam* makes for unpleasant discussions. Hence, it must be a logical fallacy.
- The *argumentum ad nauseum* is invalid. The *argumentum ad nauseum* is invalid. The *argumentum ad nauseum* is invalid. If three repetitions of this principle haven't convinced you, I'll just have to say it again: the *argumentun ad nauseum* is invalid.
- Ancient wisdom teaches that the *argumentum ad antiquitatem* is invalid.
- An argument is emotional and no substitute for reasoned discussion. But proof by equivocation is a kind of argument. Thus, a proof by equivocation is no substitute for a valid proof.
- If we accept slippery slope arguments, we may have to accept other forms of weak arguments. Eventually, we won't be able to reason at all. Hence, we must reject slippery slope arguments as invalid.
- A real logician would never make an argument based on the "*No true Scotsman*" fallacy. If anyone who claims to be logical and makes arguments based on this fallacy, you may rest assured that s/he is not a real logician.

The following additional fallacies were sent in by Rev. Hugh Ryunyo King:

- The fallacy of the undistributed middle is often used by politicians, and they often try to mislead people, so undistributed middles are obviously misleading.
- Reasoning by analogy is like giving a starving man a cookbook.
- Non sequitur is a Latin term, so that's a fallacy too.

Logical Fallacies

• And I bet the gambler's fallacy is also invalid - I seem to be on a roll!

Please feel free to submit other logical fallacies (in never-say-never form) to <u>benham@pegasus.montclair.edu</u>. I will try to incorporate the best ones into this page, even at the expense of replacing some of the ones above.

Last modified: October 5, 2001

CONSERVANTION CONSERVANTIONS CONSERVANTIONS CONSERVANTIONS CONSERVANTIONS CONSERVANTIONS CONSERVANTIONS CONSERVANTIONS

ひんや しょう じん ないた ちんや しょう じん ひろん ちんや しょう じん ひろん ちんや しょうじん ちんや しょうじん ちんや しょう じん ひろみ ちんや しょう じん ひろみ

Slephen's Cuide Index

Fallacies of Distraction

- False Dilemma: two choices are given when in fact there are three options
- <u>From Ignorance</u>: because something is not known to be true, it is assumed to be false
- <u>Slippery Slope</u>: a series of increasingly unacceptable consequences is drawn
- <u>Complex Question</u>: two unrelated points are conjoined as a single proposition

Appeals to <u>Motives</u> in Place of Support

- <u>Appeal to Force</u>: the reader is persuaded to agree by force
- <u>Appeal to Pity</u>: the reader is persuaded to agree by sympathy
- <u>Consequences</u>: the reader is warned of unacceptable consequences
- <u>Prejudicial Language</u>: value or moral goodness is attached to believing the author

• <u>Popularity</u>: a proposition is argued to be true because it is widely held to be true Changing the <u>Subject</u>

- <u>Attacking the Person</u>:
 - \circ (1) the person's character is attacked
 - 0 (2) the person's circumstances are noted
 - \circ (3) the person does not practise what is preached

• <u>Appeal to Authority</u>:

- \circ (1) the authority is not an expert in the field
- 0 (2) experts in the field disagree
- \circ (3) the authority was joking, drunk, or in some other way not being serious
- Anonymous Authority: the authority in question is not named
- <u>Style Over Substance</u>: the manner in which an argument (or arguer) is presented is felt to affect the truth of the conclusion

Inductive Fallacies

- <u>Hasty Generalization</u>: the sample is too small to support an inductive generalization about a population
- <u>Unrepresentative Sample</u>: the sample is unrepresentative of the sample as a whole
- False Analogy: the two objects or events being compared are relevantly dissimilar
- <u>Slothful Induction</u>: the conclusion of a strong inductive argument is denied despite the evidence to the contrary
- <u>Fallacy of Exclusion</u>: evidence which would change the outcome of an inductive

read a hour corrad a hour corrad

・ くっかん ひとみ ひとや ・ くっかん ひとみ ひとや ・ くっかん ひとや いくっかん ひとや ひとや ひとや ひとや ひとや ひとや ひとや ひとや ひとや いくや ・ くっ

argument is excluded from consideration

Fallacies Involving Statistical Syllogisms

- <u>Accident</u>: a generalization is applied when circumstances suggest that there should be an exception
- <u>Converse Accident</u>: an exception is applied in circumstances where a generalization should apply

Causal Fallacies

- <u>Post Hoc</u>: because one thing follows another, it is held to cause the other
- Joint effect: one thing is held to cause another when in fact they are both the joint effects of an underlying cause
- <u>Insignificant</u>: one thing is held to cause another, and it does, but it is insignificant compared to other causes of the effect
- <u>Wrong Direction</u>: the direction between cause and effect is reversed
- <u>Complex Cause</u>: the cause identified is only a part of the entire cause of the effect

Missing the **Point**

- <u>Begging the Question</u>: the truth of the conclusion is assumed by the premises
- <u>Irrelevant Conclusion</u>: an argument in defense of one conclusion instead proves a different conclusion
- <u>Straw Man</u>: the author attacks an argument different from (and weaker than) the opposition's best argument

Fallacies of Ambiguity

- Equivocation: the same term is used with two different meanings
- <u>Amphiboly</u>: the structure of a sentence allows two different interpretations
- <u>Accent</u>: the emphasis on a word or phrase suggests a meaning contrary to what the sentence actually says

Category Errors

- <u>Composition</u>: because the attributes of the parts of a whole have a certain property, it is argued that the whole has that property
- <u>Division</u>: because the whole has a certain property, it is argued that the parts have that property

Non Sequitur

- <u>Affirming the Consequent</u>: any argument of the form: If A then B, B, therefore A
- <u>Denying the Antecedent</u>: any argument of the form: If A then B, Not A, thus Not B
- <u>Inconsistency</u>: asserting that contrary or contradictory statements are both true

Syllogistic Errors

The logical Fallacies: Index

なたどろん

huse ear 24 a hhuse ea

jested se ter her to be the set ter her to the heres and the heres the heres to the heres the heres and set the heres the

じょう きんぎょく ひょうじん じんか きんぎょく ひょうじん じんぎょく ひょうじん じんぎょく ひょうじん しんぎょく ひんじょく ひょうじん じょう しんじょう しんじょう

- Fallacy of Four Terms: a syllogism has four terms
- <u>Undistributed Middle</u>: two separate categories are said to be connected because they share a common property
- <u>Illicit Major</u>: the predicate of the conclusion talks about all of something, but the premises only mention some cases of the term in the predicate
- <u>Illicit Minor</u>: the subject of the conclusion talks about all of something, but the premises only mention some cases of the term in the subject
- Fallacy of Exclusive Premises: a syllogism has two negative premises
- <u>Fallacy of Drawing an Affirmative Conclusion From a Negative Premise</u>: as the name implies
- Existential Fallacy: a particular conclusion is drawn from universal premises

Fallacies of Explanation

- <u>Subverted Support</u> (The phenomenon being explained doesn't exist)
- <u>Non-support</u> (Evidence for the phenomenon being explained is biased)
- <u>Untestability</u> (The theory which explains cannot be tested)
- <u>Limited Scope</u> (The theory which explains can only explain one thing)
- <u>Limited Depth</u> (The theory which explains does not appeal to underlying causes)

Fallacies of Definition

- <u>Too Broad</u> (The definition includes items which should not be included)
- <u>Too Narrow</u> (The definition does not include all the items which shouls be included)
- <u>Failure to Elucidate</u> (The definition is more difficult to understand than the word or concept being defined)
- <u>Circular Definition</u> (The definition includes the term being defined as a part of the definition)
- <u>Conflicting Conditions</u> (The definition is self-contradictory)

References

For Educators... Please feel free to download the <u>entire text</u> (50 K) in plain-brown wrapper HTML (does not contain the last three sections - sorry). Permission is granted to use, abuse and reproduce this document in any way you wish provided (a) you don't claim copyright over it, (b) you don't charge anyone for using it, and (c) you indicate its original authorship. Read more on my views about <u>copyright</u> if you're curious.

13 August 1996



A MUS CONNERON A A A MUS CONNER A A MUS CONNERON A A MUS CONNERON A A MUS CONNER A MUS CONNER A MUS CONNER A M

ふくやらしらもびぎゃんぶくやらしうもびぎゃんぶくやらものがざやくぶくやらもいちんいしゃういやらしらもびぎゃんぶくやらしらもびぎゃんぶくない うちびぎゃん

North N

べんちょう きんか しょう じんちょう きんかい ちゅうじん じんかい ちゅうじん ちんかい ちゅうじん ちょうかい ちゅうじん ちょうかい ちゅうしん ちょうかい ちゅうせん ちょう



Stephen's Guide Around the World

The point of an argument is to give reasons in support of some conclusion. An argument commits a fallacy when the reasons offered do not support the conclusion.

These pages describe the known logical fallacies. To browse, either go to the <u>index</u> or follow the 'next' and'previous' icons.

Each fallacy is described in the following format:

Name: this is the generally accepted name of the fallacy *Definition*: the fallacy is defined *Examples*: examples of the fallacy are given *Proof*: the steps needed to prove that the fallacy is committed

If you can think of more fallacies that you'd really like to see, please send me a <u>note</u>. For more information: please consult the <u>references</u> and <u>resource</u> pages. For educators: the entire document is now stored in one file for easy download. Please see the bottom of the <u>index</u> page. And as always, I hope you'll find the time to browse my <u>home page</u>. Thanks for the support!

In the long run, this site will become a complete discussion of logic. In my view, the reasons why the fallacies are, in fact, fallacies should be given. As a prelude to this, please take a look at <u>The Categorical Converter</u> (note that it needs to be supported with more informative pages, however, it may be of interest to people who already understand categorical inferences).

10 August 1996

Copyright © Stephen Downes, 1995,1998



The Categorical Converter

The Categorial Converter is a visual representation of all possible logical relationships between individual categorical propositions. It may be used to test the validity of an inference from one proposition to another.

ž

11. •

*

ž

4

In other words, the Categorical Converter represents all possible inferences using the eques of:

- Contradiction
- Contrary
- Subcontrary
- Subalternation
- Superalternation
- Obversion
- Conversion

A have corred a A have corred a

うちびどろんろうちんら

5. 4.6

ひょうしき きんぎょく ひょうせん ちんきょう ひょうせん ちんきょう ひょうせん ちんぎょく ひょうせん ちんきょく ひょうせん ちんきょく ひょうせん ちんきょく ひょうせん ちんき

• Transposition

From here, you may <u>view</u> the Categorical Converter. You may also learn <u>how to use</u> it, and finally, learn how it was <u>constructed</u>.

13556	reference for the forme forme for the forme for the forme for the forme for the forme
<u>I</u> D Aug	st 1996
5 6 6 1 8	
F.S. and J	
66 h S &	
and A.C.	
له (توادّ	
125.44	
AK BA	

http://www.datanation.com/fallacies/convert/welcome.htm [5/20/2002 8:55:51 AM]

The Categorical Converter

Black dots (•) are propositions. On the diagram, locate the premise and conclusion of your inference.

You have three types of tokens: (true), F (false), and U (true), F (false), and U

If the premise is true, place a true (I) token on the dot which represents the premise. If it is false, place a false (F) token on the dot.

Any path (may join the premise and the conclusion. Move the token from the premise the conclusion, following the paths, exchanging it according to the following rules:

U is never exchanged.

じん シンス・シスピート ひさん シンス・シスピート ひさん シンピート ひさん シンピート ひさん シンピート ひさん シスピート ひさん シンピート ひさん シンピート ひさん シンス


A SUSCESS IN A A SUSCESS IN A A SUSCESS IN A ASUSCESS IN A SUSCESS IN A SUSCESS IN A SUSCESS IN A SUSCESS IN A

If you have a T token, then:
If you cross a contradiction (
or contrary (
) or contrary (
) symbol,
exchange the T token for an F.
If you cross a subcontrary (
) you cross a subcontrary (
) symbol, exchange the T token for a.U.


(A) If you cross an arrow (A) pointing against your direction of fravel, exchange the **T** token for a

If you have a F token, then:
If you cross a contradiction (
or subcontrary (→) symbol,
exchange the F token for a T.
If you cross a Contrary (→)
symbol, exchange the F token for
F token for

e) If you cross an arrow (—)
 gointing toward your direction of '



http://www.datanation.com/fallacies/convert/view.htm (1 of 2) [5/20/2002 8:55:59 AM]



When moving from the premise to the conclusion, you thust avoid exchanging your token for a **U** if at all possible.

The value of the token when it tests on the conclusion is the test of the inference.

From here, you may learn <u>how to</u> the Categorical Converter or fearn how it was <u>constructed</u>.



<mark>i ()</mark> August 1996

大·シッグはなみるたち、シックドはなんまたなら、シャバはなんまたなら、シャン

42

}nPS

The first concerns the relationship of parrhesia to rhetoric — a relationship which is problematic even in Euripides. In the Socratic-Platonic tradition, parrhesia and rhetoric stand in a strong opposition; and this opposition appears very clearly in the Gorgias, for example, where the word "parrhesia" occurs. The continuous long speech is a rhetorical or sophistical device, whereas the dialogue through questions and answers is typical for parrhesia; i.e., dialogue is a major technique for playing the parrhesiastic game.

The opposition of parrhesia and rhetoric also runs through the Phaedrus—where, as you know, the main problem is not about the nature of the opposition between speech and writing, but concerns the difference between the logos which speaks the truth and the logos which is not capable of such truth-telling. This opposition between parrhesia and rhetoric, which is so clear-cut in the Fourth Century BC throughout Plato's writings, will last for centuries in the philosophical tradition. In Seneca, for example, one finds the idea that personal conversations are the best vehicle for frank speaking and truth-telling insofar as one can dispense, in such conversations, with the need for rhetorical devices and ornamentation. And even during the Second Century AD the cultural opposition between rhetoric and philosophy is still very clear and important.

However, one can also find some signs of the incorporation of parthesia within the field of rhetoric in the work of rhetoricians at the beginning of the Empire. In Quintillian's Institutio Oratoria, for example (Book IX, Chapter II), Quintillian explains that some rhetorical figures are specifically adapted for intensifying the emotions of the audience; and such technical figures he calls by the name "exclamatio". Related to these exclamations is a kind of natural exclamation which, Quintillian notes, is not "simulated or artfully designed." This type of natural exclamation he calls "free speech" [libera oratione] which, he tells us, was called "license" [licentia] by Cornificius, and "parrhesia" by the Greeks. Parrhesia is thus a sort of "figure" among rhetorical figures, but with this characteristic: that it is without any figure since it is completely natural. Parrhesia is the zero degree of those rhetorical figures which intensify the emotions of the audience.

[<u>back</u>][<u>home</u>]

Foucault, info.	What's new ?
	Scan Foucault's texts by:
	or type keywords to search the site :
Michel Foucault biography presentation interview bibliography] An overview of Michel Foucault. A short biography, completed by an interview, a presentation, and bibliographies.	Primary Texts [<u>discourse & truth</u> <u>enlightenment</u> <u>texts</u> <u>download</u> A repository of documents written by Foucault. The unabridged text about parrhesia, the article "What is Enlightenment" available in several languages, etc.
Secondary Literature [list schema submit] A space for articles, essays, outlines, book excerpts etc.	Hyperlinks [courseware documents images & audio]
sitemap foucault.info @	<u>root.ab-a.net</u> <u>e-mail</u>